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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses the key decisions made by the Diefenbaker government leading to the 
cancellation of the CF-105 Avro Arrow in 1958 and 1959, and more particularly the domestic 
factors that influenced those decisions. Utilizing a theoretical framework known in the 
theoretical literature as neoclassical realism, the thesis explores how and under what 
circumstances domestic variables can influence the capacity of a state, or its government, to 
respond to the imperatives created by the international security environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  
The popular literature on the Avro CF-105 Arrow characterizes the cancellation of the 
heralded fighter-interceptor aircraft as a national ‘tragedy,’ an inexcusable gaffe on the part of 
Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and his government.1 Diefenbaker, it is argued, 
failed to see the huge industrial and military potential represented by this technologically 
advanced, all-Canadian state-of-the-art aircraft. Some of the critics blame the US Administration 
for the Arrow affair because of its refusal to purchase, or help finance, the aircraft for use on the 
front-line of North American defence.2 The popularized view is that the Arrow program should 
have been continued regardless of its admittedly vast cost, because it was the leading fighter 
aircraft under development in the western world: “…The world’s finest aircraft, which would 
have rocketed Canada into global aerospace leadership, had been shot down by bumbling fools 
acting out an American-driven agenda. Thus a national dream died, and Canada began its descent 
into mediocrity.”3  
 This popularized account of the fate of the CF-105 Arrow has never been accepted by 
professional historians and political scientists who, however, have declined to undertake a major 
singular study of the Arrow project. The first piece on the Arrow by an academic was a section 
of a chapter in Jon B. McLin’s Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of 
a Middle Power in Alliance, published in 1967. Since McLin wrote, the only published works on 
                                                
1 The best known proponents of this view are Murray Peden, Fall of an Arrow, 5th ed. (Toronto: 
Stoddart Publishing Co., 2001), and E. Kay Shaw, There Never Was An Arrow (Toronto: Steel 
Rail Educational Publishing, 1979).  
2 The leading proponent of this view is Palmiro Campagna, who has published four editions of 
Storms of Controversy; see also Requiem for a Giant. 
3 Michael Bliss, “Arrow That Doesn’t Fly,” Time, January 20, 1997, 49.  
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the Arrow by academics includes a section in James Dow’s The Arrow, articles by Desmond 
Morton,4 Michael Bliss,5 J.L. Granatstein,6 James Eayrs,7 part of a chapter in Denis Smith’s 
Rogue Tory,8 and two articles by Donald C. Story and Russell Isinger.9 With the exception of 
Smith, academics have made an attempt to dispel some of the myths surrounding the Arrow’s 
cancellation. Most recently, Story and Isinger have found that “the decisions that led to the 
aircraft’s cancellation were made early on by the Liberal government of Prime Minister Louis St. 
Laurent, which initiated the project and allowed it to accelerate and expand beyond salvage.”10   
This thesis seeks to make a contribution to the academic literature on the Arrow by 
analyzing the key decisions made by the Diefenbaker government on the Arrow’s cancellation in 
1958-59, and more particularly the domestic factors that influenced those decisions. Utilizing a 
theoretical framework known as neoclassical realism, the thesis explores how and under what 
circumstances domestic variables can influence the capacity of a state, or its government, in 
                                                
4 Desmond Morton, “A Revisionist Perspective on the Avro Arrow,” The Toronto Star, 20 
February 1986. 
5 Bliss, “Arrow That Doesn’t Fly,” 49. 
6 J.L. Granatstein, “The Myth of Broken Arrow,” The Globe and Mail, 11 January 1997 and “We 
Shot an Arrow in the Air,” Literary Review of Canada 11, no. 5 (June 2003): 26-27. 
7 James Eayrs, “Arrow (1): the Untold Story of CF-105,” Ottawa Citizen, 19 February 1974, 
“Why it was Wise to Axe the Arrow,” Ottawa Citizen, 20 February 1974. 
8 Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker (Toronto: MacFarlane 
Walter & Ross, 1995), 317-25. 
9 Russell Isinger and Donald C. Story, “The Plane Truth: The Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow 
Program,” in The Diefenbaker Legacy: Canadian Politics, Law and Society Since 1957, ed. D.C. 
Story and R. Bruce Shepard (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1998); Donald C. Story 
and Russell Isinger, “The Origins of the Cancellation of Canada’s Avro CF-105 Arrow Fighter 
Program: A Failure of Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 6 (2007):1025-1050; see 
also: Donald C. Story, “Canadian Defence Policy: The Case Of The Avro Arrow,” (MA paper, 
University of Toronto, 1970); Russell Steven Paul Isinger, “The Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow 
Program: Decisions and Determinants” (MA paper, University of Saskatchewan, 1997). 
10 Story and Isinger, “The Origins of the Cancellation,” 1026; Isinger, “The Avro Canada CF-
105 Arrow Program: Decisions and Determinants.” 
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responding to the imperatives created by the international security environment. In the case of 
the Arrow, the thesis examines how the Diefenbaker government’s decision to cancel the aircraft 
program was a response to changes in the perception of the Soviet military threat to North 
America in the late 1950s but was influenced by disagreements between the government’s 
military advisers over the defence budget, differences within Cabinet over the government’s 
economic and social policy priorities, and pressure on the government exerted by the media, 
corporate, and other special interests, and public opinion.    
 Neoclassical realism11 does not seek to make broad generalizations over time.  Instead, it 
is useful as a framework for analyzing a particular country’s response to the imperatives of the 
international system at a specific point in time.  As a theory, it is useful because it seeks to build 
on realist propositions, and employs a case-study method to address important questions about 
the foreign and security policies of states.12 This thesis presents a case study of decision-making 
                                                
11 See Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, 
no. 1 (October 1998): 144-72; Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, 
Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1996); Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s 
Strategy for World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); William C. 
Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, NY:  
Cornell University Press, 1993); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of 
America’s World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Steven E. Lobell, 
Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and 
Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Main proponents of structural 
realism include Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw Hill: Michigan 
University, 1979); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World 
Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214; Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University, 1997); Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” 
International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/5): 50-90.   
12 Randall Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” in Progress in 
International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius 
Elman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 317.  
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by the government of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker that focuses on decisions by the 
government in September 1958 to curtail the Arrow program and in February 1959 to cancel it. 
The case shows how a government’s response to the strategic environment of the moment can 
be influenced by two categories of intervening domestic variables identified by neoclassical 
realism: differences and disagreements between the elite decision-makers over strategic 
imperatives and government policy priorities, and pressures expressed through legislative 
channels from the media, special interests and public opinion.  
In this study, the perceptions, interactions and cohesion between elites are assessed by 
examining minutes from meetings of the Cabinet and Cabinet Defence Committee (CDC), and 
the deliberations of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC), which was advising the government on 
the development and production of defence weapons systems in the 1950s. These committees 
were highly influential in framing executive or elite thinking on Canada’s security policy, 
reflecting the different perceptions by leaders of the security threat to North America, and 
ultimately on the viability of the Arrow program.  
 Secondly, the thesis identifies and examines the influence of forces that were exerting 
pressure through the legislature on elites by analyzing the content of House of Commons 
Debates, as well as reports and articles that appeared in newspapers across the country in the 
months leading up to the aircraft program’s cancellation. It measures the impact of the media and 
public opinion on the Arrow program, and moreover provides insight into the pressures on the 
government from corporate and other special interests.  
The theory of neoclassical realism claims that domestic actors such as government elites, 
policy advisers, legislators, economic interests, the media, and public opinion can exert a 
  5 
“…decisive influence on how the state interprets international threats and opportunities, and how 
it responds to them.”13 The domestic actors that exert the greatest influence, Norrin Ripsman 
says, “…are those that have sufficient power to remove the leader or executive from office, those 
that can … obstruct the government’s programmatic goals, or those that can shape the definition 
of national interests.”14 The thesis provides evidence to verify such a claim.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 Norrin M. Ripsman, “Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups,” in Neoclassical 
Realism, the State and Foreign Policy, eds. Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 192. 
14 Ibid., 192. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Neoclassical Realism 
This thesis will utilize the theoretical framework afforded by neoclassical realism to 
analyze the factors that influenced the Diefenbaker government when making decisions 
surrounding the Avro CF-105 Arrow fighter-interceptor program in 1958 and 1959.  
Neoclassical realism, part of a new wave of realist thinking, was developed by Gideon Rose and 
further refined by Thomas Christensen, Aaron Freidberg, Randall Schweller, Jack Snyder, 
William Wohlforth and Fareed Zakaria.  It argues that international systemic pressures that 
create imperatives for states are mediated by intervening domestic variables, which in turn affect 
the substance of their foreign and security policies.15 The Diefenbaker government’s decisions 
leading to the cancellation of the Arrow program are examined here as a product of international 
strategic imperatives influencing Canada in the late 1950s, but which were mediated by domestic 
forces that delayed and almost reversed the eventual outcome.  
Neoclassical realism is a theoretical framework that arises out of the earlier theories of 
classical realism16 and structural realism.17  Specifically, neoclassical realism: 
                                                
15 Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), 6; see also Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 144-
172; Michael E. Brown et al., eds. The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and 
International Security (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995); Christensen, Useful Adversaries; 
Schweller, Deadly Imbalances; Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance; Zakaria, From Wealth to 
Power. 
16 See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1948); works by Henry 
Kissinger, Reinhold Niebuhr and Arnold Wolfers. 
17 See works by Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw Hill: Michigan 
University, 1979); Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under 
the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214; Snyder, Alliance 
Politics; Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” 50-90. 
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seeks to explain why, how, and under what conditions the internal characteristics 
of states – the extractive and mobilization capacity of politico-military 
institutions, the influence of domestic societal actors and interest groups, the 
degree of state autonomy from society, and the level of elite or societal cohesion – 
intervene between the leaders’ assessment of international threats and 
opportunities and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies 
those leaders pursue. Neoclassical realism posits an imperfect “transmission belt” 
between systemic incentives and constraints, on the one hand, and the actual 
diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies states select, on the other. 18 
 
Gideon Rose first used the term “neoclassical realism” in a 1998 review article in World Politics, 
describing it as a framework that:  
 …explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and 
systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought.  Its 
adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is 
driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and 
specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are 
realist.  They argue further, that the impact of such power capabilities on 
foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be 
translated through intervening variables at the unit level.  This is why they are 
neoclassical.19 
 
Although neoclassical realism places the state in the larger context of an unchanging anarchic 
international environment, or rather sees systemic forces as driving the behaviour of states and 
their leaders who are charged with making foreign and security policy decisions, it recognizes 
that the actions by the state are nevertheless influenced by domestic-level variables.20  Because 
different states often react differently to changes in the external environment, neoclassical 
                                                
18 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin Ripsman, “Introduction: Neoclassical 
realism, the state, and foreign policy,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy ed. 
Lobell et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4. 
19 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 146.   
20 Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy, 25, 43, 
192. 
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realism posits that their responses may be due more to domestic structures and political processes 
than solely to changes in that environment.21   
According to neoclassical realism, there are two major domestic variables that can 
influence a state’s ability to pursue its security interests, or rather to respond to international 
security and power imperatives: the perceptions, interactions and cohesion between the 
executive-level elites within the state; and the domestic influence of the “legislature” or 
“legislative arrangements” of the state.  
The first domestic influence on a state’s foreign policy, according to neoclassical realism, 
comes from the perceptions, interactions and cohesion between elite actors at the executive level. 
Foreign policy, according to Ripsman, is conducted by a “foreign security policy executive” that 
includes a head of government, ministers and senior government advisers.22 These foreign policy 
elites are seen as the “ultimate ‘managers’ of security concerns and ‘guardians’ of national 
security.”23 The state does not make decisions as a monolithic body that holds one world view: 
rather such decisions come from the elites that make up the foreign security policy executive, 
who sometimes have different views of the state’s place in the international strategic 
environment, and who also sometimes exhibit varying degrees of cohesiveness in deciding 
government policy and financial priorities.24 “Statesmen,” Fareed Zakaria reminds us, “not 
states, are the primary actors in international affairs, and their perceptions of shifts in power, 
                                                
21 Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 6.  
22 Ripsman, “Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups,” 171. 
23 Wayne McLean, “Neoclassical realism and Australian foreign policy: understanding how 
security elites frame domestic discourses,” Global Change, Peace & Security 28 (2016): 6. 
24 Taliaferro, Lobell, Ripsman, “Introduction,” 28. 
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rather than objective measures, are critical.”25 Any disagreement between elites over what the 
state’s strategic imperatives are can act as an influential intervening variable. To determine how 
a state’s view of the international strategic environment is influenced by domestic actors is to 
assess which leaders’ perceptions are decisive in the decision-making process, and how different 
leaders view the domestic political risks associated with the various choices available to them.26 
An important determinant may be disagreements between the members of the military elite who 
are charged with advising government leaders on the nature of the threats present in the 
international environment; such differences can “inhibit the state’s ability to respond to systemic 
pressures”27 and even “force [elites] into pursuing counterproductive foreign and security 
policies.”28  
The second domestic influence on a state’s foreign policy is the “legislature” or 
“legislative arrangements” by which societal actors such as the media, special interests and 
public opinion get their hearing by government.29 According to Norrin M. Ripsman, such 
influences get filtered through the legislature, thereby affecting security policy decisions.30 These 
domestic influences, according to Michael Foulon, “make themselves felt through state 
policymakers, but only within the context of binding geopolitical factors that constrain.”31 
                                                
25 Zakaria From Wealth to Power, 42.  
26 Randall Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” 
International Security 29, no. 2 (Fall, 2004): 169. 
27 Taliaferro, Lobell, Ripsman, “Introduction,” 28. 
28 Ibid., 32. 
29 Ripsman, “Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups,” 170-171. 
30 Ibid., 170. 
31 Michael Foulon, “Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities,” International 
Studies Review 17 (2015): 636.  
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Ripsman argues that such influences having the greatest impact on foreign policy decisions are 
those that have a significant presence in key voting regions of the country. 
When utilized as a framework for examining the Diefenbaker government’s decisions 
regarding the Avro CF-105 Arrow, the theory of neoclassical realism draws attention to the 
influence that intervening domestic variables can have on a state’s strategic decision-making. In 
the Arrow case, the strategic realities of the new missile age, which rendered fighter-interceptor 
aircraft questionable, dictated the likelihood of the aircraft’s cancellation but were not 
determinative until reinforced by other domestic influences, and until still other domestic 
influences constraining the government were overcome. In the end, the massive costs of the 
Arrow development and production program turned the military chiefs of staff and the Cabinet 
against the fighter program, and overcame a number of domestic influences that were supporting 
its continuation; these included the concerns of the Prime Minister and the other progressive 
Ministers about the possible domestic impact of cancellation on Canada’s unemployment 
situation; pressures emanating from passionate supporters of the Arrow project, including the 
senior staff of the Royal Canadian Air Force, executives and employees at the aircraft’s 
manufacturer, Avro Aircraft, and public and media fascination with a sleek leading-edge fighter-
interceptor. 
 
The Origins of the Arrow and the Changing Strategic Environment 1953-57 
 To understand the decisions made by the Diefenbaker government regarding the CF-105 
Arrow program in 1958-59, it is necessary to provide background information about the origins 
of the Arrow program and its expansion from 1953 to 1957.  The CF-105 Arrow program began 
  11 
under the Liberal government of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent in the early 1950s, when 
Canada’s strong position among the western economies allowed the country to pursue a 
confident military posture towards the Soviet Union: this included the design and development 
of advanced military weapons such as the Arrow.32  Canada’s post-war economy was booming 
due to strong consumer demand, resource exploitation, and expansion in manufacturing – all of 
which benefited from an increase in military spending.33  The Korean War had ended but the 
Soviet Union’s explosion of a thermonuclear device in 1953 led senior officials in Canada’s 
Department of National Defence to believe that the Soviets posed an unprecedented threat to the 
western democracies.  The consequence was an intensification of Canada’s military build up 
during the next ten years.34  During the Korean War, the Canadian aircraft industry had been an 
important source of supply for the overwhelmed US defence industry, and had proved its 
capability in designing and producing the CF-100 long-range interceptor and the Argus maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft, as well as producing one of the more advanced versions of the US-
designed F-86 Sabre.35  The First Canadian Air Division had contributed 12 squadrons of F-86 
                                                
32 Roger Sarty, “The Interplay of Defence and Foreign Policy,” in Canada Among Nations, 
2008: 100 Years of Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. Robert Bothwell (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2009), 132; James Dow, The Arrow (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company 
Limited, 1979), 84.  
33 Dow, The Arrow, 83. 
34 Andrew Richter, Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons 
1950-63 (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2002), 8.  
35 Jon B. McLin, Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle 
Power in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 62.  
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Sabre fighters to NATO’s European air defences:36 all of which proved Canada’s ability to 
produce and design quality aircraft, and set the stage for the production of the advanced Arrow.37  
 The Arrow was a sophisticated, highly ambitious, all-weather Canadian fighter-
interceptor aircraft.  Although Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) officials had been planning a 
successor to the CF-100 as early as 1948, it was not until April 1953 that the RCAF obtained 
approval from the St. Laurent government for its development. The government contracted with 
A.V. Roe Company (a subsidiary of a British conglomerate, Hawker Siddeley based out of 
Malton, Ontario) to design and develop the aircraft; it was a state of the art fighter-interceptor 
with the capability of defending Canada against the most advanced bombers that the Soviet 
Union might send across the polar north.38  The Arrow would be built specifically for Canada’s 
extreme climate and vast geographic distances, having two engines, two seats, a combat speed of 
Mach 1.5, and a combat altitude of 50,000 feet.39  In what would end up working against the 
choice of the Arrow by the US or NATO as a front-line fighter, the RCAF’s sophisticated 
operating requirements for the aircraft made it far more expensive and thus much less marketable 
than other comparable aircraft then under development in the US and the UK.   
                                                
36 James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1980), 211, 220. 
37 Dan Middlemiss, “The Road From Hyde Park: Canada-U.S. Defence Economic Cooperation,” 
in Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation: The Road From Ogdensburg, ed. 
Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel (Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 183. 
38 Larry Milberry, Sixty Years: The RCAF and CF Air Command 1924-1984 (Toronto: Bryant 
Press Limited, 1985), 317.  
39 Story and Isinger, “The Origins of the Cancellation,” 1028. 
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At this time the government was spending more money on national defence than on the 
totality of government expenditures on health and welfare services.40 This massive spending on 
national defence had been replicated in other Western nations in response to Soviet 
expansionism in the early 1950s.41  However, there were growing apprehensions in the Canadian 
Cabinet, and a concern by Canada’s Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton, that 
increased defence spending might prove dangerous to Canada’s financial situation. By the spring 
of 1953, Finance Minister Douglas Abbott made the first cut to the Department of National 
Defence budget since 1947.42 
 Cuts to the defence budget added to a list of difficulties facing the Arrow.  Avro had 
originally been asked to design just the airframe for the Arrow; the engines and 
the armament would be built by other contractors in the UK or US.  However, when foreign 
engines were found to be deficient, and A.V. Roe decided it wanted an electronics system being 
developed by Hughes Aircraft Co., what was originally a project to develop an airframe came to 
encompass an engine, electronics and an air-to-air missile.43 Thus, wrote Julius Lukasiewicz, 
“the CF-105 program, which as originally conceived involved only one major development – the 
airframe – in Canada, had grown to unmanageable proportions through the addition of engine, 
missile, and fire control projects.”44 
                                                
40 Defence spending in 1952 accounted for $1.441 billion in a $3.647 billion budget – nearly 40 
percent of the total budget was spent on defence. See Debates, 8 April 1952, 1247; Story and 
Isinger, “The Origins of Cancellation,” 1029.  
41 Carter Malkasian, The Korean War (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group 2001), 71.  
42 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, 208-209.  
43 Julius Lukasiewicz, “Canada’s Encounter with High-Speed Aeronautics,” Technology and 
Culture 27, no. 2 (1986): 229.   
44 Ibid.   
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 As early as 1955, the Liberal government was growing wary of the increased costs 
associated with the Arrow program.  Defence Production Minister C.D. Howe stated in the 
House of Commons that the government had already spent about $30 million on the Arrow and 
that upon completion, the development costs would be about $100 million.45  The government 
could see that program costs were growing.  However, cancellation of the Arrow at that point 
would have been difficult to justify to the Canadian public; as one Minister told his Cabinet 
colleagues: “the government would be faced with explaining why it had spent over $50 million 
on the project and then dropped it” with no tangible defence to show for public moneys spent.46 
The costs of the Arrow had risen nearly tenfold from the initial $27 million aircraft development 
contract in December 1953, to $261 million in two years, and in September 1955, Avro’s request 
for an additional $59 million47 brought the cabinet to request a complete re-appraisal of the 
program.  Cabinet Conclusions for a 7 December 1955 meeting show Ministers calling for a 
“…thorough re-appraisal of the whole program” due to rising costs, especially when it had not 
yet been “…demonstrated that the new plane was a success.”48  One of the Ministers described 
the increased cost of the aircraft as “frightening” – and argued that a slowing of the Arrow 
program would only “postpone the time at which it might have to be admitted that the cost of 
adequate air defence was more than Canada could bear.”49  
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 The results of the re-appraisal were inconclusive but, in any case, the Liberals, facing a 
general election, considered it politically unwise to cancel the program at that time. C.D. Howe 
would later recall that the government knew that cancellation was inevitable but was going to 
await the outcome of the election.50  Had the Liberals been returned to power, senior External 
Affairs official John Holmes would later write, “there is little doubt that they would have 
cancelled the Arrow Program.”51  However, the Liberals were defeated in the election, which left 
the newly elected government of John Diefenbaker and his new Minister of National Defence, 
George Pearkes, to face the troublesome question of what to do about the Arrow program.  
 A key responsibility for a state’s military elite involves determining its security strategy 
by assessing systemic threats and opportunities.  Canada’s security strategy during the early 
1950s, according to Matthew Trudgen, envisaged: 
 the creation of a strong peacetime defence relationship with the United States, which 
included the development of the North American air defence system.  Canada would also 
work with the Americans to help support and sustain the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear 
deterrent, the bulwark for the security of the Western Alliance.”52  
 
The air defence system included three tiers of defensive radar lines, including the Pinetree Line, 
the Mid Canada Line, and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line,53 for detecting incoming 
Soviet bomber aircraft, and squadrons of fighter-interceptor aircraft for blunting the bomber 
attack. With little formal coordination of North American air defences at this time, Canada’s 
military leadership considered the development of a leading-edge fighter-interceptor aircraft 
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represented by the CF-105 Arrow to be an important part of Canada’s contribution to North 
American defence.54  However, by 1954 the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced 
the New Look, which, with its notion of massive retaliation, changed the thrust of US security 
strategy categorically from defence to deterrence.  It was still desirable to provide, as the 
Chairman of the US Chiefs of Staff confirmed, an “adequate” air defence for North America, but 
it must be realized that no air defence network, however formidable, could protect North 
America from a massive bomber attack, and certainly not from an attack by Soviet 
intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying atomic weapons. Security for North America would 
now come from Soviet fears of the unleashing of the nuclear forces of the US Strategic Air 
Command (SAC).  In such a security system, what the US wanted from Canada was not a 
leading-edge fighter interceptor to blunt the attack of Soviet bombers, but effective radar 
warning lines that would provide security for the deterrent or, in the case of a Soviet attack, give 
sufficient time for SAC aircraft to get off their bases and on their way to the Soviet Union.55  As 
for the nature of the air defence system that was to give “adequate” and cost-effective defence 
against a Soviet bomber attack, it would now include a surface-to-air missile called BOMARC, 
semi-automatic ground environment (SAGE) for coordinating air defences, additional heavy and 
gap-filler radar, and a limited number of fighter-interceptors at a reasonable cost.   
 By the mid-fifties, the international strategic realities for Canada were thus changing with 
the decline of the Soviet bomber threat, the appearance of intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) that could carry nuclear weapons, and the development of a continental defence 
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strategy - the concrete expression of which would be the establishment of the North American 
Air Defence Command (NORAD). These new strategic realities raised questions about the utility 
of manned interceptors as a viable defence against aggression.  But strategy alone did not dictate 
the decisions reached by the Diefenbaker government on the Arrow program. There were a 
number of intervening domestic variables that influenced the perspective of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, including the state of Canada’s public finances, pressure by officials at Avro 
Aircraft and from the public to build an independent Canadian defence industry, and the 
influence of Canada’s military leadership who were at odds over the allocation of the defence 
budget. All of these forces combined to influence the government as it attempted to respond to 
changes in the international security environment.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
Neoclassical realism places a focus on how intervening domestic factors influence the 
decisions made by a country’s foreign policy decision-makers. While systemic forces drive a 
state’s external behaviour and encourage the state to act as a unitary actor, internal political 
structures of the state frequently influence decision outcomes.56 Tudor Onea describes how 
systemic forces are perceived and responded to by a state’s elite decision makers: “At times, 
states will be unable to pay heed to structural requirements, either because the signals sent by 
the system are garbled by misperceptions, or because domestic politics impede the state’s ability 
to mount a timely or an appropriate response.”57 Neoclassical realism shows, in the case of the 
Arrow, how a government’s response to the strategic environment of the moment can be 
influenced by two categories of intervening domestic variables: the degree of elite consensus 
regarding the state’s strategic imperatives and its policy/program priorities; and constraints 
placed on elite decision-makers by pressures expressed through public opinion, the media, and 
special interests.58  
The first domestic variable is the degree of agreement or cohesion between executive-
level elites over the state’s strategic and policy/program priorities.59 From June 1957 when the 
                                                
56 Brian Rathburn, “A rose by any other name: neoclassical realism as the logical and necessary 
extension of structural realism,” Security Studies 17 (2008): 314; “Kim Richard Nossal, Stephane 
Roussel, and Stephane Paquin, International Policy and Politics in Canada (Toronto: Pearson 
Canada Inc., 2011), 10.  
57 Tudor Onea, “Putting the ‘Classical’ in Neoclassical Realism:  Neoclassical Realist Theories 
and US Expansion in the Post-Cold War,” International Relations 26, no. 2 (2012): 143. 
58 Justin Massie, “Canada’s war for prestige in Afghanistan:  A realist paradox?” International 
Journal 68, no. 2 (2013): 278, 281. 
59 Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, “Introduction,” 28. 
  19 
Diefenbaker government assumed office, to September 1958 when the government made its first 
of two major decisions on the Arrow, there were divisions between Canada’s military elites over 
the nature of the changes that were taking place in the international strategic environment, and 
different perspectives on their impact on Canada’s defence priorities. 
The signing of the Ogdensburg Agreement and the Hyde Park Declaration in the early 
1940s set the stage for the establishment of a Canada-US continental defence regime in the 
1950s that culminated in the signing of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) 
in 1957. The defence strategy underlying NORAD was to build up North American air defences 
in preparation for a Soviet bomber attack. However, by the mid-1950s the international strategic 
environment had begun to change as a result of the new threat posed by Soviet intercontinental 
ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons. As a result, the Western democracies began to 
turn away from traditional notions of defence and embraced a strategy of deterrence. In Canada, 
there were disagreements between members of the military elite over the impact of the new 
strategic environment on Canada’s air defence plans, and in particular whether the CF-105 
Arrow interceptor was, in the new environment, still the best means of defending Canada and 
North America. The Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC) was divided, with the Committee 
Chairman, Charles Foulkes, the Chief of the General Staff, Howard Graham and the Chief of the 
Navy Staff, Harry DeWolf arguing that the Arrow would soon be obsolete, while the new 
strategic realities called for a reduced emphasis on air defence and greater attention to missile 
research. They were opposed by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air Marshal Hugh Campbell 
and Chairman of the Defence Research Board, A.H. Zimmerman, who believed that the air 
defence of North America should be the first national security priority, in which the Arrow 
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could play a key supporting role. These differences caused delays by the CSC in providing clear 
advice to the Cabinet on the future of the Arrow program for most of 1958.  
The Cabinet was no better disposed to deciding what Canada’s defense strategy should 
be, in light of the broad policy/program priorities of the new government. As early as 27 January 
1958, the new Defence Minister George Pearkes wrote to Diefenbaker asserting that there was a 
need to reassess the nature of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and that it was not at all 
clear that it would be necessary to proceed with the CF-105 fighter-interceptor program.60 But 
such a statement prompted neither a Cabinet decision, nor even Cabinet deliberations, on the 
matter. The Cabinet was preoccupied with a national election held in the spring of 1958, and 
equally with implementing the policies and programs to which it had committed itself when it 
took office in 1957.  And the Defence Minister, it turned out, remained uncertain for most of 
1958 about whether the international strategic environment had actually changed. It would be 
August 1958 before he recommended to the Cabinet that the Arrow program could not be 
justified from a strategic perspective, and another month before the Cabinet recognized that the 
federal budget could not accommodate the new fighter program together with other required 
equipment for national defence and the new social security programs which it believed 
Canadians had elected it to implement.  
But it was not only differences between military and political elites that complicated the 
government’s response to the changing international strategic environment. There were also 
pressures coming from domestic actors such as the media, corporate and other special interests, 
and the general public––the second category of intervening domestic variables––that influenced 
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the government’s approach to its defence priorities and, in particular, its position on the Arrow 
program.   
Some of these domestic variables actually helped move the Cabinet towards a position on 
defence policy priorities that the new strategic imperatives seemed to be requiring ––that is, a 
reduced focus on anti-bomber defences. More specifically, Canada’s public finances were in a 
troubled state as a result of a recession that hit Canadians by 1957, leading the Diefenbaker 
Conservatives to make a commitment during the election campaign to cut back defence 
spending, which was consuming nearly 40 percent of the national budget. And secondly, the 
Conservatives were on record as having promised to enact a number of new social security 
initiatives, in areas such as unemployment, hospitalization, industrial price supports, and housing 
loans. These commitments did not augur well for the continuation of a fighter program whose 
costs were escalating.  
But there were other domestic variables working in the opposite direction, constraining 
the government from adopting defence plans and policies apparently dictated by the new 
strategic environment –– variables that supported the continuation of the Arrow program. The 
public’s fascination with the new fighter aircraft grew substantially with the roll-out of the first 
Arrow prototype at A.V. Roe on 25 March 1957, while defence experts and defence 
commentators continued to report enthusiastically on the progress with the development of an 
aircraft that promised to be on the leading edge of fighter technology. The main themes in these 
reports were: the thousands of jobs that were being created at Avro Aircraft, Orenda Engines, 
and a multitude of subcontracting firms; the huge impact that the Arrow program was having on 
the building of the jet aircraft and related technology sectors in Canada; and the hope that 
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Canada, through providing for its own air defence, would achieve self-sufficiency and 
independence in its foreign policy.  
Yet another intervening domestic variable was growing pressure on government officials 
from what amounted to be a vigorous pro-Arrow lobby, including senior RCAF officials, retired 
Air Force officers, labour unions representing aircraft workers, and senior A.V. Roe officials, 
including company President Crawford Gordon. As 1958 went along, these groups were 
increasingly vocal in their efforts to force the government into continuing the fighter program.  
Finally, and not least, a domestic influence that made the Diefenbaker government 
hesitate to cancel the Arrow program was its worry about contributing to the worsening of the 
already bleak unemployment situation in the country. Unemployment was a critical issue 
especially for the Prime Minister, who always insisted that governments must develop and enact 
policies and programs that could command the public’s support. His compromise proposal to 
Cabinet on 21 September 1958, which allowed the Arrow development program to continue until 
the following March, was attributable, in large part, to his concern lest cancellation of the entire 
program be a “shock to the employment situation”: if cancellation was deferred until the 
following March the economy “might be better able to stand the shock”.61  
 
A Shifting Strategic Environment  
 
By the mid-1950s technological changes had spawned a growing belief among political 
leaders in the Western democracies that manned fighters were diminishing in strategic 
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importance.62 As ICBMs began to replace long-range bombers as the Soviet delivery system for 
nuclear warheads, doubts were expressed about the cost-effectiveness of the Western anti-
bomber defence system.63 During this time, the US shelved plans for a number of new 
interceptors, and in April 1957, British Defence Minister Duncan Sandys published an 
influential White Paper that discussed the growing obsolescence of manned interceptors, and 
predicted the eventual replacement of bombers with guided missiles.64 Many of the military and 
strategic experts in the West were convinced that the Soviet Union was moving toward missile 
technology and away from long-range bombers.65 This shift in strategic thinking raised 
questions among elite decision-makers in Canada about whether the priority in Canadian 
defence planning should be the development of the costly new fighter-interceptor known as the 
CF-105 Arrow. CSC Chairman Charles Foulkes had told his fellow Chiefs in February, 1957 
that he was “concerned with the growing magnitude of expense [on air defence],” and wanted to 
“commence a long-range study to determine how much more should be invested in the air 
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defence system.”66  From the outset of the fighter program, the St. Laurent government had 
made it clear to A.V. Roe, which was developing the aircraft, that the program was subject to 
review at any time. The Cabinet now contemplated cancelling the program, but at a February 
1957 meeting put off a final decision until after the June 1957 election. 
However, that decision was interrupted by one of the biggest upsets in Canadian 
electoral history, with the Progressive Conservatives forming a minority government under 
Prime Minister John Diefenbaker.67 Most of the new Ministers had little experience in 
government, let alone in dealing with questions of military strategy and defence technology. 
They were faced, as Charles Foulkes would later say, with “two of the most 
awkward…problems any minister had ever faced”: whether to accept a proposal that had been 
put forward by US and Canadian military officials for an integrated North American Air 
Defence Command; and what to do about the troubled CF-105 Arrow program.68  
Air Marshal Roy Slemon, Chief of the Air Staff, had long argued that air defences, and 
in particular, those entailing increasingly sophisticated fighter-interceptors, were of preeminent 
importance in providing insurance in the case of a Soviet bomber attack. In a Globe and Mail 
article on 23 July 1957 Slemon reiterated his belief in the need for a fighter-interceptor like the 
Arrow as part of the North American air defence network: “…Eventually Canada can expect to 
be a potential target for guided missiles – but in the foreseeable future defence will rest 
primarily on manned interceptors such as the CF-105.”69 According to Slemon, the Soviets were 
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still building bombers and it was imperative to have a leading-edge fighter like the Arrow to 
defend Canadian territory; inferior US fighters such as the F-106 Delta Dart, the US Air Force’s 
fighter of choice, flying north from US bases, did not have the range of the Arrow or its air-to-
air missile or tracking capability.70   
Slemon’s premise was the Soviet threat would come from long-range bombers, against 
which a sophisticated fighter-interceptor like the Arrow could provide the most effective 
defence. However, the arrival of Sputnik in October 1957 confirmed that the Soviets had likely 
developed a nuclear-armed ICBM, against which there was no effective defence. Sputnik 
brought home the reality that Western defence strategy was obsolete.71 If the Soviets were able 
to put a satellite into orbit, they also had the capability of attacking the West from outer space 
using inter-continental ballistic missiles carrying a thermonuclear bomb.72 Leading US military 
strategist Herman Kahn concluded that “except for those representing vested official interests or 
occasionally military service interests, the government experts had more or less given up on the 
notion of surviving wars and were beginning to put all their bets on deterrence.”73  
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The Initial Decision on the Arrow   
 
In rendering in its first decision on the Arrow in the fall of 1957, the Diefenbaker Cabinet 
revealed its hesitation about continuing the program. The new Minister of National Defence, 
George Pearkes, told the House of Commons that the government, “upon the advice of the chiefs 
of staff, [had] decided now to continue the development of the CF-105… for a further period of 
one year, at which time the program [would] again be reviewed.”74 Pearkes himself appeared to 
support the program: “in the foreseeable future,” he told the House, “if any threat from the air 
develops against this country the manned bomber will be at least an important part of that threat, 
and therefore we must have a manned interceptor capable of firing air missiles which will have a 
homing ability, enabling them to direct themselves on the target. We believe that to be 
essential.”75 In Pearkes’s opinion, there was a partnership role for Canada to play with the US in 
providing fighter defences in North America. In another statement to the House in December 
1957, he said: Canada’s “particular role in this partnership for the defence of the North American 
continent is to provide a proportion of the manned interceptors to meet the manned bombers and 
the best judgment that I have, founded on the judgment given by our own military advisers and 
military advisers from our NATO partners, is that for many years to come there will be manned 
bombers.”76 It would soon become clear that Pearkes’s views differed from those of senior 
officials in the US Department of Defence, who were increasingly of the opinion that the 
growing threat to North American security was from ICBMs.77   
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Not long after his appointment as the new government’s Minister of Finance, Donald 
Fleming discovered that the Treasury was in much worse condition than the previous 
government had indicated. Although the Conservatives were now projecting a surplus of $106 
million78, many of those funds were already committed to programs introduced by the previous 
government. By late September 1957 the CDC reviewed Canada’s defence commitments with a 
view to determining those which could be cut back so that essential priorities could be met 
without increasing the budget.79 When presenting his first budget to the House of Commons on 
17 June 1958 the Finance Minister revealed, for the first time publicly, the financial constraints 
faced by the government. He noted that during the 1956-57 budget year $1,784 million or 37 
percent of total government expenditures had been spent on defence.80 It was two months after 
this that the Diefenbaker government would announce that this level of defence spending could 
not be sustained given the government’s new social security spending priorities in a variety of 
new areas such as unemployment insurance, pensions and hospitalization.81 
                                                
78 Debates, 6 December 1957, 2002-6; “Text of Finance Minister’s Tax Statement,” Globe and 
Mail, 7 December 1957. 
79 Donald Fleming, So Very Near: The Political Memoirs of the Honourable Donald M. Fleming, 
Volume One: The Rising Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), 414.  
80 Canada, Ottawa, Ministry of Finance, Budget Speech Delivered by the Honourable Donald M. 
Fleming, Minister of Finance, June 17, 1958 Edmond Cloutier CMG OA DSP Queen’s Printer 
and Controller of Stationery Ottawa, 1958 (Canada Department of Finance Budget Speech), 89. 
81 Trevor Lloyd, Canada in World Affairs 1957-1959 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), 
7; J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2004), 349.  
  28 
 
Elite Decision-Making: the Chiefs of Staff  
Neoclassical realism proposes that a government’s response to the strategic imperatives 
posed by the international system can be significantly influenced by differences in the 
perceptions or beliefs of the elites advising the government. For nearly a year, beginning in the 
fall of 1957 when the Chiefs of Staff began their budget preparations for 1958-59, they were at 
odds over Canada’s air defence requirements in the missile age, and in particular over whether 
the Arrow fighter-interceptor should be the weapon system of choice for Canada in the new 
strategic environment. Chief of the General Staff, Howard Graham later wrote of the inter-
service disagreements over the Arrow: 
Air Marshal Slemon, Air Force Chief from 1953 to 1957, and Air Marshal 
Campbell, who succeeded Slemon in 1957, as one might expect, continued to 
support the program even at prohibitive costs that consumed the greater part of 
any reasonable defence budget.  The Navy and Army, through their chiefs – 
Admiral Mainguy (followed by DeWolf) and Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds 
(followed by Graham)– and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 
General Foulkes, argued against it.82 
 
The disagreement between the Chiefs of Staff was essentially over whether there was a 
role in the North American air defence for manned interceptors, and over how Canada could best 
contribute to that defence, given budgetary constraints. At a Special Meeting of the CSC on 3 
April 1958, C. Roy Slemon’s successor as the CAS, Air Marshal Hugh Campbell argued 
forcefully that Canada had a responsibility to contribute to continental air defence:  “during the 
1960-67 period the Air Defence Weapons System against the manned bomber should be 
composed of manned fighters and long-range surface-to-air missiles such as Bomarc; the manned 
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fighters providing flexibility and sustained defence while the missiles provided the high attrition 
against enemy aircraft.”83 However, the other Chiefs of Staff disagreed.84 The meeting was 
called to examine a proposal to fund a major expansion the Canadian air defence system––to 
include an increase in the number of PINETREE radar, the adoption of the surface-to-air 
BOMARC missile, and a sophisticated semi-automatic ground environment infrastructure, 
SAGE, for coordinating the entire air defence network.  
By the end of June, the Chiefs of Staff were warned by the government to prioritize the 
most “essential items”85 for their respective services in order to proceed with forthcoming 
discussions with the Defence Minister on budgetary priorities. Foulkes told the CSC that “the 
probability of the military budget exceeding expenditures of past years made it mandatory that 
the various Service programs be measured against a realistic standard of the absolute minimum 
outlay required to meet commitments of first priority only.”86 He reiterated this point on 8 July 
during an early discussion of program requirements for the fiscal year 1959/60; in his view, “the 
current programme was going beyond previous estimates and that if anything new was to be 
introduced into the programme it would be necessary for cuts to be made in the presently 
approved programme.”87  Even though Foulkes anticipated a decrease in the amount Canada 
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would be required to contribute to NATO commitments, he was still firm on prioritizing the most 
essential requirements among each of the respective services.88 
 On 14 July the CSC met to discuss five alternative plans for air defence that the Chiefs of 
Staff had put together, along with advantages and disadvantages of each. Foulkes told the other 
Chiefs that “the Department of National Defence was concerned with the large amount of money 
being spent on defence against the manned bomber, compared to the small amount being spent 
on defence against the ICBM.”89 In his view, the expenditures on anti-bomber air defences were 
not sustainable. It was not possible to proceed with the Arrow program, “even if everyone agreed 
that it was the right programme, because there were not enough funds even in a budget of $2 
billion.”90 The Arrow program was too expensive and diverted funds that were necessary for new 
equipment for the army and navy, for re-equipping Canada’s European Air Division, and for 
changes immediately required for BOMARC, SAGE, and extensions to the PINETREE radar 
network.   
Of the five defence plans, four recommended continuing the development and production 
of the CF-105 aircraft. The fifth plan presented but ultimately rejected the option of cancelling 
the program, recognizing that it would be politically problematic to try “to explain away the 400 
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million dollars and cancellation charges on the CF105 project.”91 Deputy Minister of Defence, 
F.R. Miller concluded that the there was still insufficient information to make a decision on the 
program.92   
The discussion continued between the Chiefs of Staff the next day, with Foulkes 
distributing a rewrite of the five alternative plans for air defence. Campbell defended the Arrow 
program, and argued that without an interceptor force “we cannot be a partner in NORAD in that 
we cannot carry out our share of the defence load – we would in effect be out of the interceptor 
business… we would have to depend on the United States to exercise our radar defences.”93 He 
called for the installation of two BOMARC missile sites in Canada and completion of the CF-
105 program so that “…the enemy [would be] compelled to meet a variety of weapons systems 
and his problem…made more difficult.”94 The other Chiefs disagreed: continuing the Arrow 
would be extremely costly, and would mean that no funds would be available for research that 
was developing around new offensive and defensive missile technology. Foulkes added that 
“since the Chiefs had agreed to develop the CF105, great strides had been made in developing 
BOMARC, especially regarding range and accuracy”, which would “…result in the manned 
fighter becoming more and more of a ‘luxury’ item in the defence system.”95 The Chief of the 
Naval Staff was also critical of the Arrow: “he was not convinced that even if the budget were $2 
billion, we should spend a large part of it on an aircraft that would not be in service for 5 
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years.”96 These discussions reflected both marked disagreement between the Chiefs in 
determining the threats and opportunities presented by the strategic international environment, as 
well as the urgency they felt in trying to reach a decision on the Arrow. Although the alternative 
plans for air defence had been rewritten, the Chiefs were still unable to select one single plan that 
they considered to be the best option. Instead, they agreed to present multiple options to the 
Minister.97 
The CSC discussed the alternative proposals with the Defence Minister on 18 July. 
Although cancellation remained one of the options, the Minister agreed that it would be 
politically unacceptable. The Plan that had the most support called for the completion of the 
Arrow’s development (without ASTRA and SPARROW, the expensive electronics/missile 
package proposed for the aircraft) and a production of 60 (down from the 169 that had up to that 
point been planned) aircraft, the installation of two BOMARC sites, extension of the PINETREE 
network, and the installation of SAGE. However, it was agreed that such a plan was not feasible 
with a defence budget of less than $2 billion. The final decision on the Arrow’s future would 
have to await a meeting of the CDC in mid-August.  
 Discussions between the military elites over the Arrow program during this time included 
a 24 July Special meeting between the Chiefs of Staff and officials from the Defence Research 
Board (DRB). Straying for the first time in their support of the Chief of the Air Staff and the 
RCAF, DRB officials now argued that the introduction of BOMARC into Canada meant that 
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only “a few” fighter-interceptors in the Ontario-Quebec sector would be required.98 According to 
the Acting Chairman of the DRB, Dr. Keyston, “approximately 40 interceptors would be the 
maximum that could be efficiently utilized in combination with Bomarc in the Ontario-Quebec 
sector, based on the increased range of Bomarc and the limit on the rate at which Bomarcs could 
be fed into the control system… if all the available Bomarcs were to be used there would be little 
air space left in which to deploy interceptors.”99 Throughout the meeting, Campbell found 
himself on the defensive, and he was called upon by Foulkes to respond to Keyston. He replied 
that he was simply not prepared to accept the DRB’s position.100 The CAS was now alone among 
the Chiefs of Staff in defending the Arrow; he insisted that an absolute minimum of 60 front-line 
force aircraft would required in order to have an operational force.101   
On 8 August the Chiefs of Staff drafted a memorandum for the CDC containing their 
recommendations on the Arrow program. After careful consideration, the Chiefs had concluded 
that any defensible plan involving production of the CF-105 would require an annual expenditure 
of $350 million in the next three years. They had “doubts as to whether a limited number of 
aircraft at this extremely high cost would provide defence returns commensurate with the 
expenditure in view of the changing threat.” To meet any proper requirement for interceptor 
aircraft, they stated, “it would be more economical to procure a suitable number of proven 
aircraft which [had] been developed.” The recommendation followed that authority be granted 
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for the cancellation of the CF-105 Arrow and associated fire control and weapons systems 
projects.102  
Foulkes was aware of the possible negative domestic political fallout of such a decision; 
however, after months of CSC meetings he had come to the conclusion that the disadvantages of 
continuing the CF-105 program far outweighed the advantages. In a lengthy aide memoire 
prepared on 25 August for the Minister he cited three considerations that had led him to such a 
conclusion: the declining need for interceptors as a result of the Soviet shift to ICBMs; rapid 
changes in technology that rendered surface-to-air missiles more efficient and cost effective than 
fighter-interceptors; and the exorbitant cost of completing the Arrow program with no guarantees 
that the estimated costs would not increase.103  
 
Analysis of the Military Elite 
An examination of the role of the Chiefs of Staff in the decision-making on the Arrow 
reveals that their continuing failure to resolve their differences on Canada’s defence priorities 
and on the defence budget stalled until August 1958 all possibilities of the Diefenbaker Cabinet 
giving full consideration to the question. It was only after it became clear that the amount of 
defence that would be provided by an agreed upon budgeted amount for the Arrow program did 
not justify the program’s cost that the Chiefs of Staff were able to recommend that the Arrow 
program be discontinued. In other words, it was the finances around the Arrow program that 
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brought the military elites back to a position that was aligned with the realities of the strategic 
environment. This is a strategic scenario that neoclassical realism framework does not appear to 
anticipate––where differences between elites over priorities or perceptions, far from preventing a 
government from embracing the strategic realities of the international environment, actually 
encourages it to do so. 
 
 
Elite Decision-Making: the Cabinet and the CDC 
 
The CSC, however, was not the only the only elite group that had difficulty reaching a 
consensus on the Arrow program––as became evident at meetings of the Cabinet and the CDC 
during the spring and summer of 1958. Ministers expressed differing views about the nature of 
the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and about how, in terms of a defence system, to counter it. 
Some Ministers believed that while “…the U.S.S.R. was ahead of the Western world in the 
development of the ICBM”,104 the threat from bombers, and thus the need for anti-bomber 
defences, would continue to exist for the next several years.105 Others believed that the Arrow 
program should be discontinued given the changed strategic environment and budgetary realities. 
“Commitments accepted in 1951,” declared one of the Ministers, “when aircraft cost $400,000 
each, could not be honoured now when aircraft alone cost ten times as much. We could not re-
arm and re-equip all our forces now and still live up to those commitments.”106 
Pearkes broke the logjam at a meeting of the CDC on 15 August. He argued that a recent 
reassessment of the threat to North America showed that while manned bomber aircraft [would] 
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continue to pose a threat during the 1960-65 period, “ICBMs [would] progressively replace them 
as the primary threat.”107 The Soviet Union had been developing ICBMs at a rapid pace over the 
past year and there had been a sharp decrease in the production of manned bombers.108 Pearkes 
drew attention to the finding of the Department of External Affairs that “there might be more 
likelihood of a continuation of the cold war and of the outbreak of local incidents along the 
fringes of the free world than of the launching of a definite attack on North America by the 
Soviet Union.”109 At length, he recommended that “authority be granted for the cancellation of 
the CF105 Arrow programme and associated fire control and weapons systems projects.”110  
It did not take long for word of Pearkes’ recommendation to spread. The morning of 
the same day, Douglas LePan in the Department of External Affairs took a phone call from 
Foulkes, the message of which he relayed to his Undersecretary: “…Mr. Pearkes had just 
decided to recommend to Cabinet against continuance of the CF-105 programme.”111 
According to LePan, Pearkes’ recommendation had been given:  
… as a result of his visit to Washington, where he had apparently been impressed by 
the disparity between the unit cost of the CF-105 and of comparable interceptors that 
might be available before long for purchase in the United States. Apparently also, the 
United States authorities had expressed some doubt as to whether or not so many 
squadrons of interceptors would be required in the northern half of North America as 
the Department of National Defence had been assuming.112  
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Pearkes had tried to convince the Americans to purchase the Arrow but, as had been the 
case with earlier requests, he was turned down: the US Secretary of Defence, Neil McElroy, 
made it clear that the US was unwilling to provide any funding for the program through 
purchasing any Arrows for the US Air Force. However, he had told Pearkes that he would sell 
US-produced interceptors to Canada at a reduced cost, and provide US air support in the event 
of an emergency over Canadian airspace.113 The conversation with McElroy was a decisive 
factor in changing Pearkes’ mind on the Arrow: according to James Dow it was “the key that 
opened the door to cancellation.”114 In a later interview with J.L Granatstein, Pearkes recalled: 
The Americans at that time had a lot of fighters which were not quite as good although 
they claimed they were as good as the Arrow and those were available for action against 
any attackers – they would have come over Canada – for a defence against bombers.  So 
really, it wasn’t necessary to have such a very expensive item [as the Arrow].115  
 
Evidently Pearkes still believed that fighter-interceptors were an important requirement in North 
American air defence, but he thought that there needed to be sufficient room in its defence 
budget for army and naval defence programs, NATO air defence commitments, anti-missile 
defence research, and expansion of the North American air defence infrastructure. This would 
not be possible if the Arrow program were continued.  
 
The Opposition Weighs In 
 
The same day that Foulkes was informed of Pearkes’ decision that the Arrow program 
should be cancelled, there was a discussion of the program and Canada’s defence priorities in the 
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House of Commons. The Leader of the Opposition, Lester B. Pearson possessed some 
understanding of the complexity of the issues that were being examined in meetings of the CDC 
and the CSC, based upon his own experience with the program during the St. Laurent years. In 
his Commons speech, he asked:  
"What do we do now?  By "we" I mean parliament, which will have to provide the money. 
 Do we continue the development and production of this particular manned interceptor [the 
Arrow] at this cost?  We will have spent by the end of this year about $400 million on the 
development and planning of this aircraft, and we will have about 37 to show for it.  A 
decision now has to be taken as to whether or not go ahead to the point where these planes 
will be introduced into our squadrons along, perhaps later, with the Bomarc missile; or do 
we abandon this project in the light of developments in the last two years which seem to be 
emphasizing the importance of other forms of air defence, which may not replace but will 
certainly have to supplement the CF-105?  Do we try to do both?"116 
 
 Pearkes declined to provide a direct answer, but offered a frank admission of the 
difficulty that the government was having reaching a decision on the Arrow and related defence 
questions:  
"The Leader of the Opposition referred to the dilemma which exists. He pointed out the 
problems which have to be solved.  I am not in a position today to put forward a solution to 
these problems.  I am not quite certain on what horn of the dilemma I must rest.  We have 
to collect more information before we make a decision which will affect the security of the 
country and mean the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars over many years.  As I 
stated in the committee, before the end of the year a decision will have to be reached in 
respect to many of these very difficult problems.  They are with me every day and pretty 
nearly 24 hours of every day. Solutions will be reached and will be presented to parliament 
in due course."117 
 
 
Elite Decision-Making: The Cabinet and Cabinet Defence Committee 
While Pearkes believed that the Arrow program should be cancelled, Diefenbaker 
insisted that the program undergo a comprehensive review before any decisions were made. No 
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decision, he told the CDC, should “be taken without full knowledge of the history of the 
programme.”118 It would not have been unreasonable for the Cabinet to have cancelled the 
Arrow program at this time, if only on the basis of the CSC’s recommendation. Indeed Finance 
Minister Donald Fleming reminded the Cabinet that the proposed weapons systems were 
continuing to “rise in cost beyond the financial capacity of Canada to pay its own way.”119 He 
welcomed “most warmly”, from the financial point of view, Pearkes’s suggestion that the Arrow 
programme and associated projects be cancelled “due to the intolerable…strain which 
continuance of that programme would have placed on the national budget.”120  
But some Ministers, including the Prime Minister, had reservations about making a 
decision that could hurt the Canadian aircraft industry and worsen the already troubling 
unemployment situation in the country: more than 15,000 employees at Avro Aircraft and 
Orenda Engines, which were developing the CF-105’s airframe and engine, would lose their 
jobs, followed by thousands who were employed at sub-contracting firms.121 At a 21 August 
CDC meeting, there was more discussion about the future of the Arrow, centring on the domestic 
effects of cancellation. It was pointed out that since Avro Aircraft Limited and Orenda Engines 
Limited had no other government contracts, both companies would probably cease to operate if 
the program were cut, and cancellation would affect the employment of about 25,000 persons.122 
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The furthest that the CDC was prepared to go at this time was to recommend that Cabinet 
consider cancellation of the Arrow program as a possibility––while granting the Chiefs of Staff 
the authority to proceed with the negotiations with the US regarding cost-sharing of BOMARC 
bases and the expansion of PINETREE, and the possibility of procuring an already developed 
interceptor to replace the Arrow.123 Including the Arrow in cost-sharing negotiations with the US 
was not considered, and the US authorities had already made it “quite clear” that they did not 
intend to buy any CF-105s.124 
The minutes of a Cabinet Meeting held on 7 September show that “although ministers 
were relatively well agreed on the purely defence aspects, the serious problem still requiring 
consideration was the possible effects of cancellation on employment and the general economic 
situation.”125 The Prime Minister was concerned lest the government be blamed for making 
decisions that exacerbated the growth of unemployment in the country. Finance Minister 
Fleming stated that back in October 1957 he had supported the continuation of the program for 
one year; but “the military view was that the programme should be cancelled. In these 
circumstances, he did not see how the government could decide not to discontinue it.”126 For 
Fleming the $400 million per year for four years that would be required if the Arrow were to 
continue could be better spent elsewhere; “cancelling the programme would be of much greater 
help to the economy as a whole than continuing it.”127 But not everyone agreed: the progressive-
minded Ministers including Diefenbaker, Defence Production Minister Raymond O’Hurley and 
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Labour Minister Michael Starr thought that cancellation of the program with its attendant layoffs 
could have a serious psychological impact on Canadians, contributing to a recession in the winter 
from which it would be even more difficult to recover.128 Spending some money on the program 
during the winter would mean putting the decision off until the economy was better. This would 
cost less than a decision that could cause or contribute to a real depression, and it might help the 
public to be more optimistic about the economy.129 Pearkes and Fleming, however, remained 
firm on their recommendation of cancellation based on the rapid escalation in program costs and 
the perceived need to shift to missile defences.    
The next day Diefenbaker was still undecided, and the Cabinet still split about what 
should be done about the Arrow program. The Prime Minister proposed that a final decision on 
the recommendations of the CDC should be deferred for a week or two, “…in the hope that new 
alternatives could be worked out, or a compromise reached.”130 Cabinet agreed, and deferred the 
decision on the Arrow for two weeks.  
The Cabinet Conclusions for the 21 September 1958 meeting reveals that “few ministers 
had changed their minds on the desirability of cancelling the contracts for the Arrow and its 
associated equipment…[but Ministers were] clearly divided in its view of the central 
question.”131 Those who wished to continue the contracts were still chiefly concerned that 
cancelling the program would hurt industry and exacerbate unemployment, and those advocating 
that the program be cancelled were concerned about the increasing cost and perceived 
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obsolescence of fighter interceptors.132 It was argued that continuing the program would involve 
ignoring the advice of the military; if the public discovered that this had occurred, the perception 
would be that the government was spending money on an obsolete program for apparent political 
or economic gain.133 In the end, Diefenbaker proposed a compromise, which involved “carrying 
on the development programme until March but ending the production programme on the Arrow 
and the Iroquois. This continuation of development might be regarded as a form of insurance in 
the present tense situation.”134 Diefenbaker was apparently referring to the tensions in the Far 
East at the time caused by a Chinese threat to invade the tiny islands of Quemoy and Matsu – it 
was believed that a threat to these islands constituted a threat to the peace of the entire region, 
and especially to the island of Formosa, of which the US Administration was guaranteeing 
military protection. At length, the Cabinet decided that “the development programme for the 
Arrow aircraft and the Iroquois engine should be continued until March 31st, 1959, within the 
scope made possible by the amounts available for it in the estimates for the current fiscal 
year;”135 however, production of the aircraft and engine would not be ordered, and there was the 
added requirement that a comprehensive review of the program be carried out before March 31st.  
 
Elite Decision-Making: Cabinet Differences over Program Priorities 
 
A key factor influencing discussions of the Arrow program during 1958 was disagreements 
within the Cabinet over priorities, and specifically, over how the budget should be allocated to 
policy and program areas. That the Cabinet was constrained in deciding policy and program 
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priorities generally was evident the moment Finance Minister Fleming announced a 
“mammoth”136 deficit of $648 million for 1958-59. During the budget debate he emphasized the 
gravity of the financial situation:  
I suppose it rarely falls to the lot of a Minister of Finance to be faced with conditions of his 
own choosing in preparing his budget. Hon. Members will not be slow to realize that a 
minister who is faced with a deficit of $648 million is severely circumscribed in writing the 
kind of budget he would have wished.  But we live in a world of realities.137  
 
The Globe and Mail later put the deficit figure into historical perspective, reporting that the 
released budget figures represented “the biggest peacetime deficit ever announced by a finance 
minister.”138 For Prime Minister Diefenbaker, however, a budget deficit was warranted where the 
spending of public funds could assist a wide range of Canadians; he reminded his Cabinet 
constantly that the Conservatives had been elected on the basis of its election promises, which 
included a variety of new social programs. There were some in the Cabinet who agreed with him 
and some who did not. Patrick Kyba argues that it would be: 
…too facile to characterize the split in cabinet as simply between the “spenders” and the 
“savers,” although this was an aspect of the struggle. One camp, led originally by Alvin 
Hamilton and Gordon Churchill with the occasional support of the prime minister, believed 
the government had to intervene actively in the economy to bring the growth rate back to 
the desired level, even if this meant an increase in the deficit. The other group, led by 
Donald Fleming with the support of his department, placed its faith in fiscal restraint and a 
balanced budget, and in this they had the full support of James Coyne, the governor of the 
Bank of Canada.139 
 
Fleming elaborates in his memoirs:  
 
I was receiving far less assistance from them [my Cabinet colleagues] and from the Prime 
Minister than I needed, particularly in resisting expenditure. I found myself constantly at 
                                                
136 Fleming, So Very Near, Volume One: The Rising Years, 461.   
137 Debates, 17 June 1958, 1250. 
138 See Harvey Hickey, “Big Deficit Forecast by Fleming,” Globe and Mail, 18 June 1958. 
139 Patrick Kyba, Alvin: A Biography of the Honourable Alvin Hamilton, P.C. (Regina: Canadian 
Plains Research Centre, 1989), 209.   
  44 
odds with them and far too often playing a lonely role in rejecting expenditures we could 
not afford.  It was impossible for us to make ends meet then, but I never lost sight of that 
goal or weakened in my determination to achieve it.140 
 
But the Prime Minister’s will prevailed when it came to determining the government’s priorities. 
Thus the 1958 Speech from the Throne made reference to a variety of new social security 
initiatives, including plans for hospital insurance and diagnostic services, unemployment 
insurance, veterans benefits, housing, public works, and agricultural stabilization.141 Spending on 
national defence was evidently not a priority for the Diefenbaker government: the Estimates that 
had been presented to Cabinet in early April showed a small overall expenditure increase for 
defence but no increase for new equipment.142 Pearkes, while Conservative defence critic, had 
argued for a reduction in defence spending, or at least a more even redistribution of the existing 
defence budget among the services –– the air force at that time was receiving an unprecedented 
48.5 percent of the total defence budget.143 The St. Laurent government, he claimed, had been 
undisciplined in budgeting for national defence purposes: there should be “no room for moneys 
to be spent on any armament or equipment which [was] not required for an essential role.”144  
 
Elite Differences: Systemic Influences 
Neoclassical realism proposes that government decision-making on strategic questions can 
be influenced by issues or problems of a systemic nature within government. One of the systemic 
issues, in the case of decision-making on the Arrow, was the serious tensions that existed 
                                                
140 Fleming, So Very Near, Volume One: The Rising Years, 554.  
141 Debates, 12 May 1958, 5-6. 
142 Michael Barkway, “Our Defence Dilemma,” Financial Post, 24 May, 1958.  
143 Debates, 1 April 1957, 2912-13. 
144 Ibid., 2913. 
  45 
between Diefenbaker personally and the government’s military advisers. In terms of policy 
outcomes, these tensions worked against the alignment of Canadian defence policy with 
international strategic trends. The public controversy over the government’s early approval of the 
NORAD Agreement in 1957 was the first of a number of developments that made Diefenbaker 
wary of accepting the advice that the government was receiving from the CSC.145 As Pearkes 
later explained: “[Diefenbaker] had a certain distrust of generals at large and he was not 
particularly anxious to hear their opinions. He would rather hear my opinion in his office rather 
than have one of the Chiefs of Staff express an opinion in a committee.”146 According to Greig 
Stewart, Diefenbaker suspected members of the CSC of leaking information to officials at Avro 
Aircraft in the late summer of 1958, and gave the Chiefs of Staff a dressing down, “warning 
them of serious consequences if the indiscretions continued.”147 Moreover, the Cabinet 
Conclusions of 21 September 1958 contain traces of the Prime Minister’s suspicion of the 
Chiefs: “There was some question as to just what the views of the Chiefs of Staff really were on 
[the Arrow] issue and how much reliance should be placed upon them. Their recommendation 
for termination of the programme now appeared to be at variance with their views earlier.”148 
 Another systemic influence affecting the Diefenbaker government’s actions in dealing 
with the Arrow question was the Prime Minister’s determination that his government be seen as 
different from its Liberal predecessor. The public perception of the St. Laurent Cabinet was that 
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a small number of Ministers made most of the decisions. Diefenbaker insisted that, while he was 
Prime Minister, every Minister would have a say in Cabinet and that Cabinet decisions would 
require the agreement of all. The consequences for efficiencies in Cabinet decision-making were 
spelled out sometime later by Douglas Harkness, Pearkes’s successor as Defence Minister:  
[Diefenbaker] …spent far too much time in cabinet asking the opinion of every member in 
connection with most questions.  He would frequently have a series of meetings, with the 
result that ministers spent far too much time in cabinet and were not in a position to devote 
the amount of time that they needed to run their own departments.  At some periods, when 
matters of considerable importance were up for discussion and decision, we would have 
two cabinet meetings a day almost continuously for a week or more.149   
 
Roy Faibish reported similarly:  
If there wasn’t a consensus and he didn’t think the person holding out was a fool, to the 
exasperation of those of us who knew we were on the right course and wanted to get on 
with it, he would roll it over, bring it up another time, try to bring him around, almost like 
a lawyer trying to bring a jury around so you’ve got all the twelve heads nodding. In the 
end he usually decided, but he took so long that he was accused, properly, of 
procrastination.”150 
 
The Influence of the Media, Special Interests and the Electorate on Decision-Making 
 
Neoclassical realism asserts that “at times domestic actors can exert a decisive influence 
on how the state interprets international threats and opportunities, and how it responds to them… 
In general, the domestic actors that can be most influential are those that have sufficient power to 
remove the leader or executive from office, those that can use their veto to obstruct the 
government’s programmatic goals, or those that can shape the definition of national interests.”151 
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Decisions by the Diefenbaker government on the Arrow in 1958 were clearly influenced by 
pressures coming from a variety of domestic actors, including the print media, corporate and 
other special interests, and parts of the electorate, who believed, for various reasons that the 
Arrow should be continued.  
The public’s fascination with the CF-105 Arrow grew in 1958 as reports emanated from 
the press conveying details about progress at Avro on the fighter project and about its leading-
edge technology. Public interest reached a crescendo on March 25 when, after a four-day delay 
in the original plans, a gleaming white prototype of the aircraft was rolled out of Avro Aircraft’s 
hangar at Malton. Its impact on the onlookers was marred only by the press’s simultaneous 
report of the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik, which seemed to bear the contrasting inference 
that the bomber gap had been replaced by the missile gap.152 But public enthusiasm about the 
Arrow continued, and was reported in editorials published in magazines like Maclean’s,153 and in 
the Globe and Mail,154 and reinforced by columnists like James Hornick,155 Michael Barkway156 
and Franklin Russell157 who were in favour of Canada developing and producing the Arrow. 
Together, these writers advanced three major arguments. The first was that the Arrow met the 
continuing need for a sophisticated fighter-interceptor for North American air defence; all of the 
talk about the shift to deterrence caused by the arrival of the missile age missed the point that the 
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Soviets were still building long-range bombers. The second was that the Arrow program was 
having a huge impact on the development of the aircraft, electronics and related 
technological/scientific sectors in Canada. And thirdly, thousands of jobs were being created for 
Canadians at Avro, Orenda Engines, and their subcontracting firms. 
With the arrival of summer, and reports that the Arrow’s development costs would likely 
climb to $400 million amidst the accumulation of evidence that the day of the manned aircraft 
was over, the arguments in favour of the Arrow program slowly evolved into arguments against 
cancelling it. Giving testimony to the House of Commons Estimates Committee throughout June 
and July, Pearkes still insisted that the “major threat for several years ahead [would] continue to 
come from manned bombers.”158 But by the third week in August the Defence Minister and the 
Prime Minister were feeling the effects of a sustained and increasingly vocal pro-Arrow lobby 
that included actors like the United Auto Workers, the International Associations of Machinists, 
A.V. Roe Executives, the RCAF, which had seconded officers to Avro Aircraft to monitor the 
Arrow program’s progress, and the press.   
The most aggressive of the lobbyists, not surprisingly, were senior management officials 
at A.V. Roe. Vice-President of Avro Aircraft, W.A. Curtis, formerly Canada’s Chief of the Air 
Staff, delivered a vigorous address to the RCAF Benevolent Association in Ottawa in May, in 
which he disputed the notion that the Arrow was obsolete in the new missile age: “We know,” he 
declared, “that the Russians have been working on a Mach 2 bomber…as long as such a threat 
exists there will be a requirement for an aircraft like the Arrow”.159 Utilizing an argument 
derived from his World War II experience that Canada “…must never again be dependent upon 
                                                
158 Clark Davey, “Hopes Laid On Success Of Arrow,” Globe and Mail, 8 July 1958. 
159 “Curtis Denies Arrow Too Costly, Obsolete,” Globe and Mail, 13 May 1958. 
  49 
sources outside our own borders for first line aircraft,” Curtis claimed that the Arrow was the 
“most advanced aircraft in the free world today”, whose development had created a whole new 
jet engine industry, new jobs, and “…increased the level of our technical know-how and 
capability.”160 Curtis was followed by Avro’s President, John Plant, who publicly disputed the 
notion that it was cheaper to buy or build fighter aircraft under lease.161 In early September, Plant 
was also quoted by James Hornick in a report to the Globe and Mail: “If, because there may be a 
development coming behind the Arrow, we declare it to be obsolete and do nothing, we will find 
ourselves with no weapons whatsoever until the next one comes along. And so on, so we will 
never have any weapons.”162  
According to author James Dow, senior A.V. Roe officials knew by the end of August 
that the Arrow program was in serious trouble.163 While A.V. Roe President Crawford Gordon 
was in England, Conservative Party strategist, John Tory met with Diefenbaker to discuss the 
program’s status but left the meeting with no guarantees. Tory then requested a meeting between 
himself and Avro Aircraft President Fred Smye and Pearkes, Fleming and the Minister of 
Defence Production, Raymond O’Hurley; later that day Smye met separately with O’Hurley and 
Deputy Minister of Defence Production, David Golden. Pearkes and Fleming reported to the 
Cabinet at a 3 September meeting that these meetings had been productive,164 but Pearkes 
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asserted that proposals submitted by A.V. Roe officials outlining possible savings on the Arrow 
development program “should be treated with reserve.”165   
Lobbying by A.V. Roe reached its peak about two weeks later when the company 
President, Crawford Gordon decided to deal directly and in person with the Prime Minister on 
the matter. The legendary meeting between Gordon and Diefenbaker on 17 September has been 
described by some analysts as instrumental in turning the Prime Minister’s instinctive support of 
the idea of an all-Canadian fighter-interceptor developed and produced by Canadians into a 
determination not to be pressured by anybody into a decision on the program’s future. As Greig 
Stewart tells the story, Gordon was advised by his staff to fly rather than take the overnight train 
to Ottawa, so that he would “arrive quietly and refreshed” for the meeting with the Prime 
Minister:  
Gordon refused, and…he boarded a train for Ottawa, arriving many hours later at the 
Prime Minister’s door, ‘bombed’ and in ‘no shape for solid conversation’. To further 
aggravate matters, the Prime Minister couldn’t see Gordon right away, but let him cool his 
heels for almost two hours…When the Prime Minister was finally available, Gordon, still 
wearing his trench coat, got up, lit a cigar, and with something of his old, confident air, 
marched in to meet Mr. Diefenbaker….Gordon refused to sit or to let the Prime Minister 
get a word in.  One can only imagine the scene.  On one side of the desk, the Prime 
Minister of Canada, with all the assurance of a majority government; on the other side, the 
powerful but decadent industrialist, cigar in mouth, smelling of Scotch, pounding on his 
adversary’s desk, demanding a guarantee that the Arrow not be scrapped… When Gordon 
failed to lower his voice or stop the pounding, the Prime Minister warned he would be 
forcibly removed if he didn’t settle down.  At this, Gordon turned and stomped out, his 
trench coat flaring like a cape behind him.  The “meeting” had lasted less than twenty 
minutes.  When Gordon met [Joe] Morley in the hall, his only comment was, “We’ll turn it 
around,” but later, when he called [Fred] Smye, he described the meeting as the most 
devastating experience of his life.166 
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Grattan O’Leary, a confidant of Diefenbaker, had his own version the events: “I was sitting in 
the anteroom when this fellow came out and he was white as a sheet.  I was next in, and Dief 
said, ‘I have just told him that the thing is off.’”167  
 While annoyed by all of the lobbying,168 and offended by Gordon’s disrespectful 
behaviour, Diefenbaker was still reluctant to bring the Arrow program to an end. By the end of 
August, the CSC had advised Pearkes to terminate the program, based on strategic and resulting 
budgetary considerations. But the Prime Minister was influenced by another reality facing the 
government––a troubled Canadian economy. In Cabinet, serious concerns were expressed about 
possible layoffs of “well over 25,000” personnel at Avro Aircraft and Orenda Engines, which 
would have “an extremely adverse effect on the economy,” which at that time “…needed every 
push it could get.”169 The Prime Minister was on record as promising improved employment 
prospects for Canadians under a Progressive Conservative government: “Canadians,” he had 
declared during the election, “realize your opportunities! This is the message I give you, my 
fellow Canadians. Not one of defeatism. Jobs! Jobs for hundreds of thousands of Canadians. A 
new vision! A new hope! A new soul for Canada.”170 In fact, Canadians were now very 
concerned about jobs and about growing unemployment in the country: in a March 1958 poll, 
86.1 percent of respondents identified unemployment as being “the greatest single problem 
facing Canada today.”171 
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Years later, Donald Fleming wrote of how unemployment was always on Diefenbaker’s 
mind: “The prospect of widespread unemployment haunted Diefenbaker. At every report he 
affected to see us going the way Bennett went in 1935. Such jitters were usually the prelude to 
asking cabinet to embark on some half-baked job-creation program without adequate 
consideration of the cost or the dangers of the precedents we were creating.”172  
Unemployment remained the besetting problem facing cabinet. It dominated all our 
meetings.  Not even after the general election did it yield the leading place in our 
deliberations.  It simply terrorized Diefenbaker…In early January [1958] we were given a 
forecast that unemployment during that winter would reach a postwar record.”173 
 
This fear of contributing to growing unemployment helps to explain Diefenbaker’s 
compromise proposal in September 1958 that the Arrow development program be continued 
until the following spring. The Prime Minister was also acutely aware of the possible electoral 
fallout of the aircraft’s cancellation in the Peel constituency, held by a sitting Conservative 
Member, in which Avro Aircraft and Orenda Engines were located. According to the Cabinet 
Conclusions of the 21 September 1958: 
The chief concern of those who wished to have the Arrow contracts continued was the 
probable shock to the employment situation of such a major termination of work as would 
be involved in the cancelling of these contracts.  It was recognized that the major impact 
would be psychological, not simply financial and it was very difficult to judge just how 
important an economic factor it would be.174 
 
 
The September 23, 1958 Press Release 
 
 When it came down, the decision on the Arrow program was announced by means of a 
23 September 1958 press release, which reflected the influence of diametrically opposed forces 
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within Canadian society on the Diefenbaker government. There were two parts to the decision. 
The first part, widely interpreted by the public at the time as the effective cancellation of the 
Arrow program, affirmed that the Arrow would not be put into production and the ASTRA and 
SPARROW programs would be discontinued. The justification for this decision was that the 
Arrow program had been overtaken by strategic realities: “the preponderance of expert opinion” 
was that the “number of supersonic interceptor aircraft required for the RCAF air defence 
command will be substantially less than could have been foreseen a few years ago, if in fact such 
aircraft will be required at all in the 1960’s, in view of rapid strides being made in missiles by 
both the USA and the USSR.”175 The reference to missiles, and more particularly the “coming 
age of missiles” and the importance of “maintenance of an effective deterrent against 
aggression” seemed to say that a fighter-interceptor like the Arrow would serve no purpose 
because the threat would come from intercontinental missiles––against which there could be no 
effective defence. In this respect, James Dow has argued, the press release was deliberately 
misleading:176 it wanted to give the impression that there was no longer any use for an anti-
bomber weapon like the Arrow with the arrival of the missile age, but then turned around and 
made the argument that Canada must accept BOMARC––basically a different kind of anti-
bomber weapon. It seemed to say that the Arrow was obsolete in a new strategic environment, 
when it really should have admitted that the Arrow was simply too expensive and easily 
replaceable by a financially less costly and, in some respects, superior anti-bomber weapon, the 
BOMARC. The estimated cost of completing the development of the Arrow was $1 ¼ billion in 
addition to the $303 million already expended, which would amount to $12 ½ million per 
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aircraft. The comparative cost of installing BOMARC, together with improvements to 
PINETREE and the SAGE electronic control computing equipment, which were necessary for 
coordinating and controlling surface-to-air missiles, was unstated. However, it was argued that 
negotiations with the US Administration would work out arrangements for Canadian industry to 
share in the production of such equipment.  
 Whatever the merits of Dow’s claim that the Diefenbaker government deliberately misled 
Canadians, it was, in deciding to cancel production of the Arrow, choosing to follow the dictates 
of the new strategic environment –– which called for moving away from high-cost active air 
defences and towards missile defence. Such a decision was delayed until September 1958 by a 
combination of differences among the Chiefs of Staff and Cabinet Ministers over policy/budget 
priorities, and domestic pressures from Arrow enthusiasts, defence experts and commentators, 
RCAF leaders, and A.V. Roe officials. But the differences among the Chiefs of Staff finally 
narrowed and the lobbying by pro-Arrow groups and individuals ultimately failed in the face of 
the financial unsustainability of an aircraft project, the end product of which was still uncertain. 
But there was a second part to the Diefenbaker’s 23 September press release. While the 
Arrow was not to go into production, and ASTRA and SPARROW were to be cancelled, the 
Arrow development program was to continue forward until the spring of 1959, at which time a 
decision would be made on its future. “The Government believes”, the press release stated, “that 
to discontinue abruptly the development of this aircraft and its engine, with its consequent effects 
upon the industry, would not be prudent with the international outlook as uncertain and tense as 
it is.”177 The allusion to the impact of cancellation of the Arrow on Canadian industry reflected a 
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genuine concern on the part of Diefenbaker and other Ministers lest the government be accused 
of making decisions that contributed to the deteriorating unemployment situation in the country. 
This situation was made worse, it was inferred, by an apparently tense situation posed by China’s 
threat to the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, which could escalate into a major international 
conflict into which Canada might be drawn. The Cabinet Conclusions for a 21 September 
meeting show that the impact of cancellation on industry and the unemployment situation likely 
weighed more heavily on the Prime Minister and the other Ministers than the worry about the 
tense situation in the far east––for they noted that “if in fact war broke out, it would be necessary 
to use current types of aircraft and possibly to concentrate on the CF-100 rather than proceed 
with the CF-105.”178 These concerns, chapter three will show, would start to gradually fade from 
view in the early months of 1959.   
Neoclassical realism asserts that a nation’s security and defence policy is “determined by 
a twofold use of systemic and domestic-level variables, locating causal dynamics at both these 
levels, but focusing expressly on domestic dynamics to explain the external behavior of a 
state.”179 In the case of the Arrow program, there were several of these domestic variables that 
prevented the government from coming to an early decision that conformed to the strategic 
imperatives of the day. One was the differences among Canada’s military elites over the strategic 
rationale of the Canadian air defence system in the changing international environment. A 
second was the high priority given by the Diefenbaker Cabinet to implementing a series of 
reforms to Canada’s social security programs, and its relative lack of interest in expanding 
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Canada’s air defences. A third was the Cabinet’s concern about making decisions that would 
harm industry and cause an increase in the number of Canadians who were unemployed. The 
international security environment had been altered by the increased threat posed by Soviet 
intercontinental missiles, the increased integration of the continental defence forces of Canada 
and the US, and the perceived decline of the bomber threat – all of which called for less 
emphasis on active defence forces in North America, including those provided by fighter-
interceptors. Until September 1958 there were several domestic influences that constrained the 
Diefenbaker government from responding accordingly.180  
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CHAPTER THREE 
The 23 September 1958 decision not to proceed with production of the CF-105 Arrow 
fighter-interceptor can be viewed as an outgrowth of Canada’s recognition of the gradual shift in 
the international strategic environment away from defence and towards deterrence. But there 
were a number of domestic variables that influenced the government’s decision-making. One of 
these variables was the insistence by the military elites that the Army and Navy’s procurement 
needs and future investments in missile research were at least as important, in budgetary terms, 
as a single fighter-interceptor, no matter how technologically excellent. A second variable was 
the Cabinet’s decision that the government’s election promise to expand social security programs 
could not be honoured if production of the highly expensive Arrow project went ahead. A final 
variable was the excessive and thus counterproductive lobbying efforts by senior A.V. Roe, 
RCAF officials and other groups of Arrow enthusiasts which ended up alienating the Prime 
Minister and other Ministers who might, for reasons of national pride, have supported the 
program. 
But the Cabinet hedged in its 23 September decision, apparently not totally convinced 
that the Arrow program should be abandoned: the government’s press release stated that the 
Arrow development program would be continued until the spring of 1959. The hedging reflected 
lingering doubts in Cabinet, and especially in the mind of the Prime Minister, who worried 
constantly about public support, and about the domestic impact of halting a major industrial 
development project that would throw thousands of Canadians out of work. A second concern, 
according to the Cabinet minutes, was the possibility of an eruption of the Quemoy-Matsu crisis 
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in the Far East into a full-scale and lengthy war, towards which Canada would be unable to make 
a military contribution without a supply source of military aircraft.  
Chapter three will examine elite decision-making and domestic influences in Canada that 
led to the eventual cancellation of the entire Arrow program in February 1959. With the use of 
the framework provided by neoclassical realism, it will show that the domestic actors who had 
lobbied the government to continue the Arrow program throughout 1958 had an impact on 
government decision-making, but were ultimately unsuccessful because of the excesses of their 
pressure tactics and also because of the escalating costs of the Arrow development program. 
These factors, together with the government’s determination to fulfil its election commitments 
to develop new social security programs in areas such as unemployment insurance, 
hospitalization, family allowances, and housing gave Cabinet Ministers, and especially the 
Prime Minister, sufficient comfort to overcome their doubts about domestic consequences of 
cancellation, including contributing to the growth of the unemployment lines by laying off 
thousands of workers at Avro Aircraft, Orenda Engines, and the sub-contracting firms.  
  
The Strategic Environment 
The strategic environment remained essentially unaltered between September 1958 and 
the February 1959 announcement to cancel the Arrow program. Defence Research Board studies 
conducted in October 1958 by the Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment’s R.J. 
Sutherland reaffirmed the emerging strategic shift to ballistic missiles and the need to curtail air 
defence spending accordingly.181 These studies provide evidence that the military elites accepted 
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that defence was becoming less important than deterrence, and that air defences focusing on the 
manned bomber were effectively useless in dealing with a missile threat.  
By December, statements by US officials both about the prospect of US support for the 
Arrow project and about US intentions concerning the procurement of its own fighter aircraft 
also reflected the widely accepted view that the international security environment had changed. 
At the first meeting of the recently struck Canada-US Committee on Joint Defence held on 15 
December 1958, the US Secretary of Defence, Neil McElroy confirmed that his own Department 
was not including new interceptors in its funding requests for the 1960 fiscal year. The Defence 
Department was “cutting down drastically on interceptor procurement.”182 Finance Minister 
Donald Fleming told McElroy that the Canadian government wanted to know “with finality” the 
viewpoint of the US government on the possibility that it might be interested in the CF-105 
Arrow. The response of McElroy was that US views were indeed final on this question: “The US 
government could not possibly buy any CF105s”.183 Pearkes reported in turn to a 22 December 
1958 Cabinet meeting that McElroy “had made it clear that the U.S. government would not buy 
the CF-105.”184 In his memoirs, Fleming would later say that it was Bob Anderson, Secretary of 
the US Treasury who had “answered briefly, decisively, and finally, ‘No’” to the question of 
whether or not the US would buy the Arrow.185 Shortly thereafter, the United Kingdom also 
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refused to purchase the aircraft, thus diminishing the possibilities for a continuation of the Arrow 
program.186  
 
The Influence of the Media, Special Interests and the Electorate on Decision-Making  
 
Commenting on the 23 September press release, newspaper editorials from the 
Vancouver Sun, Edmonton Journal, Winnipeg Free Press, Financial Post, Montreal Gazette, 
Globe and Mail, and the Toronto Daily Star were universally in agreement that the government 
had faced a difficult decision, especially because cancellation of production would mean the loss 
of hundreds of millions of dollars that had been spent on the aircraft’s development, as well as 
the potential loss of a highly skilled workforce within the aircraft industry. The editorial writers 
recognized the validity of the arguments that had been made in support of the continuation of 
Arrow program, but concluded that the government had been warranted in cancelling plans for 
the Arrow’s production.187 Generally speaking, editorialists were critical of the Arrow program 
because of its escalating costs. According to the Edmonton Journal, the Arrow would end up 
costing thirty times as much as the famous Second World War era Spitfire;188 to continue 
production for a further three years would mean spending $300,000,000 more than Canada’s 
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entire defence budget for 1958.189 The comparison of the cost of the Arrow and the Spitfire put 
into perspective the exorbitant cost of Canada providing for its own defence. Reports in the 4 
October 1958 edition of the Financial Post indicated that in order to acquire both the Arrow and 
the SAGE-BOMARC system, there would have to be a 30 percent increase in the defence 
budget.190 Even though cost projections varied according to whether or not development 
expenses were included, or whether they were put forward by pro- or anti-Arrow lobbyists, the 
public was for the first time becoming aware of how much the Arrow would cost Canadian 
taxpayers.191 The Globe and Mail alone among newspapers across the country accepted the cost 
of the Arrow program as justified, and it alone among newspapers across the country viewed the 
government’s 23 September press release as indicating a temporary postponement of the 
program.192 
Several Canadian reporters commented favourably on the halting of the production 
program. Arthur Blakely, a reporter on Parliament Hill for the Montreal Gazette, defended the 
government’s decision because of the cost to the national taxpayer,193 and emphasized that in 
light of a lack of foreign markets, the Arrow could not be “justified solely and simply as a make-
work project.”194 Tom Gould of the Vancouver Sun was also highly critical of the Arrow 
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program, and described funds already spent on the program and budgeted for the next six months 
as “money down the drainpipe”; according to Gould, the entire program should have been 
cancelled outright.195 A critical editorial article in the Sun echoed Gould by stating that it made 
“no sense to spend $100,000,000 more on the defunct Arrow” during the interim period from 
September until the projected March 31 deadline.196  
Shortly after the September 23 announcement, the Prime Minister left Ottawa on a seven-
week international tour. By the time of his return to Canada in early December, Canadian 
defence analysts had resumed their ongoing criticism of the fighter project. In January, former 
Major General W.H.S. Macklin, while speaking at McGill University’s Conference on World 
Affairs, contended that Canada’s defence was “obsolete,” and that the defence budget was 
“bankrupting” the country and would contribute to the loss of the Cold War.197 In a series of 
articles entitled “What is Wrong with Defence?” published on 13 and 14 January, Macklin 
argued that money spent on the Arrow was “money blown away.”198 The program had cost 
nearly as much as the St. Lawrence Seaway; that wasted money could have been used to 
subsidize a merchant navy fleet for “twenty years.”199   
Former Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Guy Simonds, having opposed the 
Arrow program back in 1954, told the Winnipeg Free Press that the costs of the program were all 
out of proportion to the usefulness of the aircraft. He remained convinced that “the CF-105 
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Arrow would be obsolete before it went into service.”200 Canada should concentrate instead on 
helping to build a “defence against missiles”201 with more money allocated for defence against 
the ICBM.202  Simonds interpreted the 23 September press release, as did many others, as 
meaning that the Arrow would be cancelled, and he commended the government for making a 
“sensible decision not to spend millions or billions on aircraft which have become obsolete as far 
as strategic attack and defence are concerned.”203  
But with the arrival of 1959 there was a noticeable change in the debate occurring around 
the Arrow program. The number of voices expressing support for the fighter-interceptor seemed 
to increase, having the effect of creating a lobby that pressured the government on a daily basis. 
As Greig Stewart has remarked, not one day passed without there being an article on A.V. Roe in 
at least one of the Toronto daily newspapers.204 Representatives of some of Avro’s 
subcontractors warned about the thousands of workers who would lose their jobs in the event of 
the cancellation of the program. Suppliers in Montreal called the government’s decision to cancel 
production an “awful mistake,” and expressed concerns about its probable effect on 
unemployment in the country.205 A.V. Roe’s President and General Manager, Crawford Gordon 
was having nothing of the criticism of the Arrow and chose to interpret the 23 September press 
release as meaning the program would continue: “I want to stress most emphatically,” he 
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declared, “that the Arrow program has not been cancelled;” rather “the Prime Minister’s 
statement said that the development program is to continue and the whole matter [would] be 
reviewed in March.”206 A.V. Roe executives now engaged in an intense lobby of the 
government: as Pearkes later said: “We were besieged by the A.V. Roe people – they were 
always knocking at the door.”207 According to Pearkes, the lobby included RCAF officials who 
had been seconded to A.V. Roe to monitor the fighter program.208 It also included labour union 
leaders, with the President of the Canadian Labour Congress urging the government to proceed 
with a “substantial” order for Arrows.209  
 The September announcement prompted renewed efforts to frame the Arrow as an issue 
having to with the country’s national pride and independence. In early October 1958 former 
Liberal Finance Minister Walter Harris criticized the Conservative position on the Arrow as 
being “inconsistent with its policies concerning Canadian sovereignty.”210 Stirring national pride 
was an effective strategy, as Diefenbaker was sensitive to those who maintained that Canada’s 
independence would be eroded by the loss of the Arrow and its subsequent reliance on US 
interceptors.211 He understood that the nationalist narrative resonated with the Canadian public, 
evidence of which was supplied by the Edmonton Journal editorial expressing concern over 
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Canada becoming “a mere satellite of its giant neighbor to the south”212 with respect to 
continental defence. Crawford Gordon provided fuel for this narrative in press statements 
arguing that reliance on other countries such as the US for defence would represent a “long step 
backward from the position of independence which this country has been laboriously building 
over the years.”213  
When Diefenbaker came into office, A.V. Roe’s public relations director had urged 
Crawford Gordon to portray A.V. Roe as a Canadian company, given that its funding came first 
and foremost from Canadian taxpayers.214 Now he did just that, according to the Montreal 
Gazette’s Arthur Blakely:  
From the moment that the Government’s inclination to discontinue the Arrow first became 
evident, Mr. Gordon mustered all of the resources of his large company to force the 
Government to change its mind. Every means was employed to appeal directly to the 
public over the Government’s head. The possible fate of skilled Canadian technicians – the 
possibility of a substantial addition to unemployment as a result of a single stroke of 
Government policy – these were tossed into the field of public controversy. Canadian pride 
in an aircraft designed and manufactured in Canada was exploited to the full. As was the 
spectre of a possible loss of Canadian sovereignty.215  
 
A further surge in public support of the Arrow appeared in the press immediately 
following a provocative 25 October Maclean’s article by Blair Fraser. Fraser interpreted the 
government’s 23 September statement to mean that the Arrow would definitely not be continued, 
and he commended the government’s courage in making such a difficult decision: 
The plain truth is nobody thought the government would have the courage to make such a 
painful decision. The fact that the decision was right didn’t carry enough weight.  It meant 
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an early end to more than twenty thousand jobs, most of them in the very heartland of the 
Conservative Party. It went against the emotional urges of all Canadian air-force men, and 
most air-force veterans. It disappointed a big Canadian industry with many big 
Conservative shareholders. In short, it was political poison, of a kind to scare any politician 
out of a year’s growth.216 
 
According to James Dow, the Fraser article hit Malton “like a missile.”217 The reaction 
from A.V. Roe was swift. The company published a number of pieces in newspapers across the 
country with the intent of emphasizing the achievements of the company. The articles expressed 
confidence that the Arrow and Iroquois engine would in fact be ordered into production, and 
highlighted the company’s contribution to the Canadian economy, and the Arrow’s contribution 
to Canadian sovereignty.218 Gordon provided his own defiant response to Fraser’s article in the 
20 December 1958 edition of Maclean’s: “We should and will go on building Arrows…The day 
of the manned interceptor is not over…”219 
While the press had been of the view that the Arrow was, as an Edmonton Journal 
editorial put it, “a dead duck,”220 in November Air Marshal Roy Slemon, Deputy Commander-
in-Chief of NORAD went on record, stating that the Arrow program needed to continue because 
of the aircraft’s superiority over the alternative fighter that was being proposed for Canadian 
defence, the US Air Force’s F-106.221 Slemon’s statement, made to US and Canadian press 
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representatives at NORAD’s headquarters, stressed that the manned interceptor would be an 
“inescapable requirement”222 in the air defence system “for as far into the future as we can 
see.”223  
That this advice was coming from the Deputy Commander-in-Chief at NORAD, who had 
previously served as Canada’s Chief of the Air Staff, created confusion over whether the 
government was intent on cancelling the Arrow program.224 An editorial in the Montreal 
Gazette argued that it would be “inconceivable that Air Marshal Slemon should make statements 
in sharp conflict with announced Canadian Government policy” without being aware of 
change.225 A front-page article in the Vancouver Sun similarly took Slemon’s statements to 
indicate that there could be a change in government policy: “Until Slemon spoke Monday, it 
was generally conceded that the Arrow was dead, killed by a government policy statement made 
Sept. 23.”226 Opposition Leader Lester Pearson told the Edmonton Journal that he considered 
Slemon’s statements to be unacceptable because they appeared to contradict government 
policy227 and brought an “additional note of confusion and uncertainty to a situation which is 
confused enough.”228  
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The confusion generated by Slemon’s public statements was discussed at length in 
Cabinet in the late fall of 1958. It was agreed that Slemon had “placed the government in a 
difficult position and had discussed matters of government policy which normally are outside the 
province of senior military officers.”229 Slemon “should have known that the matter was a 
political issue…The question was whether a military officer had acted in a manner to challenge 
the civil control of policy.”230 Crawford Gordon considered Slemon’s statement as constituting 
expert opinion, using it to bolster his own claims that the Arrow should be continued.231  
When Diefenbaker returned from his world tour, he expressed his displeasure at Slemon’s 
statement. He was “shocked” by the statement, which he read about in the press: it “was not a 
question of whether Slemon’s remarks had been misinterpreted or not but whether he should 
have made a statement of that kind at all.”232  Diefenbaker resented the remarks because they 
suggested that the government was not in control of its own agenda:   
Avro had put on a tremendous publicity campaign and [Slemon’s statement] played right 
into their hands. If the government decided to continue development it would be accused of 
giving in to a powerful lobby.  Pressure was coming from other sources in Ontario too. 
Even if he thought the decision reached last September was wrong, he was determined, 
because of what had happened since, to adhere firmly to it.233   
 
Diefenbaker’s reference to pressure from “other sources in Ontario” was to the lobbying 
campaign waged by Ontario Premier Leslie Frost to keep the project alive.234 Fleming later 
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recalled that the government had been “bombarded”235 by representatives from the Frost 
government:  
Our [Conservative] MPs representing the several ridings in the Malton area saw their 
political futures at stake, and Les Frost, planning the next Ontario provincial election the 
following spring, also interceded very actively on behalf of the Arrow program.236 
 
With the arrival of 1959 the Liberal Opposition also weighed in on the subject of the 
Arrow, with Lester Pearson criticizing the government in the House for its poor articulation of 
Canadian defence policy, and its confusing position on the Arrow program:  
We have had little or no information from the government up to the present but the press is 
full of statements from officers, active and retired, from industries and unions and from 
experts and non-experts dealing with this matter. The confusion that has resulted has not 
been cleared but, as I said, has even been confounded by official statements by spokesmen 
of the government… We are reaching, if we have not already reached, a cross-roads in our 
defence policy. The developments of the past year or two have been very important 
indeed.”237 
 
Nearing the end of January, however, it was becoming apparent that the heavy lobbying 
by A.V. Roe executives, senior military officials, defence experts and press editorials and writers 
in favour of the Arrow would have at best a limited effect on the Prime Minister. He told the 
House of Commons on 19 January that:  
Lobbies will have no effect on the decision that this government makes on the question of 
defence. That statement applies generally. While the government will at all times welcome 
suggestions, ideas and arguments, I think the experience generally has been that the 
stronger the lobby, the weaker the argument.”238 
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Elite Decision-Making: Cabinet and the CDC  
The record of meetings of the Cabinet and CDC between November 1958 and February 
1959 show a Cabinet that believed that the changes in the strategic environment did not warrant 
Canada developing and producing its own fighter aircraft. But there were, as through most of 
1958, influences at the elite level pulling the Cabinet in different directions on the question of 
whether to continue the development program. One of these was the general state of public 
finances. At a Cabinet meeting on 27 November 1958, the Finance Minister revealed that the 
government was already faced with a possible $700 million deficit for 1958-59, with a possible 
deficit of $900 million for the following year based on proposed department estimates.239 It was 
necessary, Fleming emphasized, “to do everything possible to reduce the $900 million [deficit] 
figure.”240 Two days earlier, Pearkes had told the Cabinet that only the cancellation costs of the 
Arrow would be included in the Estimates for 1959-60; no provision had been made for 
proceeding with the Arrow program after 31 March.  Although Diefenbaker was not in 
attendance at the Cabinet meeting, and Pearkes did say that this decision could be reversed if the 
government decided to continue the development program, it now proceeded under the 
assumption that the Arrow would be cancelled.241  
A second influence was the continuing concern within Cabinet about the high cost of the 
Arrow program, given the uncertainty of the benefits to be gained from the fighter program in 
the new strategic environment of deterrence. While A.V. Roe announced that it had found 
savings by replacing the electronics and missile package with a cheaper system produced by 
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Hughes Aircraft, and was proposing a revised per-unit price of $7.02 million as opposed to the 
$12.86 million per aircraft, as of 1 September 1958 (not including the cancellation charges for 
the electronics/missile package or the cost of its replacement), Pearkes told the Cabinet that the 
question was not ultimately about costs but about the “contribution” that the CF-105 would make 
to North American defences, which he thought would be “small.”242  The F-108, which the US 
Air Force had set its sights as its front-line fighter-interceptor, had a considerable advantage over 
the CF-105 in terms of its range. In fact Canada might not be faced with purchasing an 
interceptor, if the US committed itself to a much cheaper means of defending against a bomber 
in the BOMARC missile. 243 
With the arrival of February, the Cabinet was made aware of some other cost projections 
related to equipment for security and defence. Canada’s F-86 aircraft in the RCAF Air Division 
in Europe were obsolete, and NATO military authorities were requesting that they be replaced by 
aircraft possessing a strike capability. It was estimated that the cost of replacement aircraft, the 
most likely candidate being a plane produced by Grumman, could be as high as $500 million.244 
When the Estimates were fully discussed in Cabinet on 3 February, the Prime Minister 
speculated that there might be questions about the Arrow development program, given that there 
was no funding for it. He mused that it might be advisable to make a final decision now, and 
announce cancellation when the estimates were tabled. He had discussed the Arrow and other 
defence matters with the Chiefs of Staff a few days earlier, who had said that “no new military 
factors regarding either the manned bomber threat or developments to meet the threat…had 
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emerged since September which would have a bearing on the Arrow decision.”245 The strategic 
imperative continued to call for a decreased emphasis on fighter defences and more of a focus on 
deterrence and anti-missile research. Pearkes provided more detail on the current state of the 
finances around the Arrow program, observing that $105 million more would be required to 
carry the Arrow program forward until 31 March. While costs had been reduced, he still 
considered that the production of 100 aircraft at this price could not be justified, and he 
recommended once more that the development program for the Arrow be discontinued.246 But 
the Cabinet was not ready to make a decision before the previously announced March date. 
Reflecting the lingering differences in the Cabinet over the Arrow, there was still some strong 
feeling that before a decision was made, the Cabinet should consider “what steps might be taken 
to maintain employment at AVRO.”247 But other Ministers believed it was “impractical to think 
of providing other work for AVRO as soon as the Arrow programme was halted.”248  
Evidently unable to get agreement around the Cabinet table, the next day Diefenbaker 
departed from his usual practice and called a meeting of the CDC to discuss the issues around the 
Arrow. The meeting began with Pearkes putting forward a recommendation that further 
development of the Arrow be discontinued. The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff added that his 
Committee was still of the opinion that “the changing threat and the rapid advances in 
technology particularly in the missile field, along with the decreasing requirements for manned 
interceptors in Canada, created grave doubts as to whether a limited number of aircraft of such 
extraordinarily high cost would provide a defence return commensurate with the 
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expenditures.”249 These comments caused another lengthy debate covering old ground. The old 
argument that Canada must, at all costs, provide for its own air defence was addressed by one of 
the Ministers:  
Canada could not be expected to provide every type of defence for her own territory. 
The defence of North America was a matter of mutual defence and Canada was 
making her contribution by the provision of air space, expenditures on warning 
systems, communications, Bomarcs and with respect to a share in the ballistic missile 
early warning system. The NORAD agreement would enable U.S squadrons of 
interceptors to be stationed temporarily in Canada, but if the risk of attacks from 
manned bombers was declining quickly, as many believed it was, such stationing 
might never be required, let alone the provision of interceptors by Canada herself.250 
 
One of the reasons why the Cabinet had hesitated to cancel the Arrow program in 
September 1958 was the threat of a world war arising out of a crisis involving the tiny islands of 
Quemoy and Matsu. That situation now “appeared to be better”, according to the meeting 
minutes, although the prospect of the Soviets cutting off access to West Berlin had become cause 
for real concern. One of the Ministers argued that the tensions over Berlin were sufficient 
justification for not demobilizing the technical team at A.V. Roe. But aside from this, the only 
other argument made to continue the Arrow program was that there would be some 
disenchantment among the public in the case where Canada was supplying aircraft to the Air 
Division in NATO for the defence of Europe, yet did not possess its own interceptors to defend 
the homeland.  
During the meeting, the Deputy Minister of Defence Production reminded the Committee 
that the costs associated with the development of the Arrow were continuing to climb. 
Development costs to 31 October 1958 had been $264.4 million. As of now, the projected 
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development costs as of 15 February were $325 million and $45 million for charges for the 
cancellation of ASTRA and SPARROW; if the Arrow program was to be terminated at the end 
of March, the costs would be $342.2 million and $40 million respectively. The External Affairs 
Minister followed by declaring that the Arrow program should be cancelled at once, to save 
money. These were all arguments that further reinforced the strategic case in favour of cancelling 
the Arrow––which was reiterated during the meeting by the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee: 
The Chiefs of Staff had reviewed their position regarding going into production on 
the CF-105 that morning. They reviewed the advice they had tendered to the Cabinet 
on this subject last August 22nd and they were still of the opinion that the changing 
threat and the rapid advances in technology, particularly in the missile field, along 
with the decreasing requirements for manned interceptors in Canada, created grave 
doubts as to whether a limited number of aircraft of such extraordinarily high cost 
would provide a defence return commensurate with the expenditures.”251  
 
In the end, after a lengthy discussion, the CDC “agreed to recommend to the Cabinet that further 
development of the CF-105 aircraft be discontinued now.”252 
Back in Cabinet, Pearkes reiterated the view of the Chiefs of Staff that the threat of an 
attack on North America by manned bombers was “rapidly diminishing.”253  Pearkes “felt that 
Russia would not consider launching an attack until it had a large arsenal of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles. Against these, manned interceptors were useless.”254 The US had cut back on 
the development of fighter-interceptors to a point where it was developing only one, the long-
range F-108; this fighter could defend the entirety of Canada.”255 
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Such arguments did not deter A.V. Roe officials, who, now becoming desperate, chose to 
pursue the high-risk strategy of trying to force the government’s hand. On 14 February, the 
Acting Minister of Defence Production, Howard Green, acting in the place of the Minister, 
reported the company’s latest announcement that the development costs of the Arrow were 
“likely to exceed the financial limitations that had been previously set on the programme, and 
that, unless these financial limitations were increased, it would be necessary for them [Avro] 
now to begin laying off personnel until such time as the contract was extended or terminated.”256 
Green was incensed, and declared that the reply should be that the company would be paid 
reasonable and proper costs until the contract was terminated. Here was yet another instance of 
counterproductive results flowing from blatant pressure tactics.     
In the discussion that followed, the other remaining issues that had caused the Cabinet to 
hesitate on the Arrow’s cancellation back in September were addressed. The 23 September 
statement had indicated that the development program for the aircraft would be continued until 
March because of the uncertainty of the international situation caused by the crisis involving 
Quemoy and Matsu. These circumstances had now changed: the threat of a conflict had passed. 
Secondly, the argument that the optics would be all wrong were Canada to supply fighters to 
NATO while not having its own aircraft to defend its own territory was questionable. For the 
RCAF “would be using Bomarcs to defend Canada, and no decision was being proposed now to 
use aircraft in Europe;”257 moreover, the NATO requirement might not be for fighters but rather 
missiles. The Cabinet agreed that the final decision on discontinuing the development of the 
Arrow should be taken at a Cabinet meeting to be held on 17 February. It was expected that all of 
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the Cabinet would be present that day, including the Minister of Labour, who still had concerns 
about the decision’s impact on Canada’s employment situation, and the Minister of Defence 
Production whose Department would be most seriously affected.258  
One last attempt to pressure the government to save the Arrow was reported at the outset 
of the 17 February meeting of Cabinet. Minister without Portfolio, James Macdonnell recounted 
a conversation he had had the previous day with Ontario’s Premier Leslie Frost, who had spoken 
“in strong terms about the effects of terminating the Arrow contract upon the municipalities in 
the vicinity of Malton.”259 Fleming recalled a similar conversation that he had had with Premier 
Frost, in which the premier “had also spoken to him in pungent language about work on the 
Arrow being stopped. Mr. Frost had complained about so little notice being given to Avro, and 
had asked why other contracts could not be given to the company.”260 In reply, Fleming had told 
the Ontario Premier that the Arrow program had been discussed at length and all of the options 
“exhaustively” considered; the government’s decision had been taken on the basis of “the best 
military advice available.”261 He reminded the Cabinet that it had been understood from the 
outset of the Arrow project, back in 1953, that the Arrow program would be reviewed year by 
year. At length, the Cabinet reached agreement that the “development of the Arrow aircraft and 
Iroquois engine be discontinued, effective as of the time of [the] announcement.”262   
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Cancellation Announcement  
On 20 February, the Prime Minister announced to the House of Commons the 
government’s decision to cancel the Arrow, citing the “nature of the threats to North America in 
future years, the alternative means of defence against such threats, and the estimated costs 
thereof” as having been “carefully examined” prior to coming to the decision.263 He reassured 
the House that the government had “taken fully into account the present and prospective 
international situation,” describing the “rapidly changing defence picture” as requiring difficult 
decisions.264 Diefenbaker referred to the “almost unbelievable nature of the world in which we 
live” when referring to the fact that “the bomber threat against which the CF-105 was intended to 
provide defence [had] diminished, and alternative means of meeting the threat [had] been 
developed much earlier than was expected.”265   
Domestic factors clearly played a key role in influencing the Diefenbaker Cabinet’s 
decision to cancel CF-105 Arrow.  Ministers debated the domestic implications of cancellation 
through six Cabinet meetings from 31 December 1958 to 14 February 1959.266 While the 
external environment did eventually determine Canadian defence policy due to the perceived 
diminishing requirement of interceptors, the absence of foreign markets, and rising costs, 
decision-making was prolonged by an array of domestic considerations, such as growing 
unemployment in Canada and the related debate over budget priorities. The military elite in 
Canada, the CSC, had come to the conclusion that the changed international strategic 
environment diminished the importance of manned interceptors as the primary means of 
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defending the country. On these grounds, they had recommended that the Arrow be cancelled on 
22 August 1958, and then again on 5 February 1959. However, it took Diefenbaker and his 
Cabinet months to come to a consensus and to make a final decision. The Cabinet’s delay can be 
explained, using the framework of neoclassical realism, by examining the domestic influences 
that were pulling the government in different directions –– influences such as the editorial 
writers and defence experts in the media, Arrow enthusiasts, former Canadian defence officials, 
members of Parliament from the Malton constituencies, and the Premier of Ontario. Not least, 
and arguably one of the most influential of the factors moving the government in the direction of 
accepting the dictates of the changing international environment, were the extreme and ill-fated 
attempts by senior A.V. Roe officials to force the government to continue the Arrow program.  
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this case study has been to provide an analysis of the key decisions made 
by the Diefenbaker government from 1958 to 1959, leading up to the cancellation of the Avro 
CF-105 Arrow. Using the framework of neoclassical realism, it has focused on the factors that 
influence a state as it responds to the demands of the international strategic environment. In the 
case of decision-making regarding the Arrow fighter-interceptor, neoclassical realism is used to 
analyze two specific categories of intervening domestic variables: the degree of elite consensus 
on strategy and on the government’s policy and program priorities; and domestic influences on 
elite decision-makers expressed through public opinion, the media, and special interests. While 
the strategic environment of the late 1950s seemed to require a reduced number of interceptors, 
thus calling into question the utility of the expensive Arrow program, the Diefenbaker 
government found itself influenced by various domestic forces pulling it in different directions as 
it tried to decide on the program’s future.  
The government’s delay in arriving at a decision was the consequence, to a considerable 
degree, of differences among the military elites in assessing the changes in the strategic 
environment and in deciding what Canada’s defence strategy should be. As Massie has observed, 
“decision-makers may disagree on the imminence and nature of threats, as well as on the proper 
means to counter them.”267 In this case, differences among the military elites were reflected in, 
and compounded by, their disagreements over how Canada’s defence budget should be allocated 
between the Air Force, Army and Navy. The Chiefs of Staff never did reach total agreement on 
what Canada’s defence strategy should be, but they did agree that, given the advance of missilery 
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in the international system, and the increased demands on Canada’s defence budget regarding 
security in North America and Europe, the development and production a single fighter-
interceptor program of such expense as the CF-105 Arrow was not supportable or sustainable. 
The disagreements among the military elites had a faint echo at the level of the Cabinet, where 
Canada’s Defence Minister, George Pearkes, and some of the other Ministers, remained 
uncertain about whether the international strategic environment had in fact changed all that 
much. Some were inclined to believe that the Soviet bomber threat continued to be real and thus 
that a fighter-interceptor like the CF-105 Arrow could be justified.  
Yet another factor contributing to the government’s delay was the insistence by the Prime 
Minister that the government always make decisions that would have the support of the 
electorate: Diefenbaker and most of the Cabinet understood fully that there would be serious 
electoral fallout from a decision to cancel the Arrow program, which would throw more than 
25,000 employees in the aircraft industry out of work, in addition to 15,000 employees working 
at Avro and Orenda.  
Pushing the government towards cancellation of the aircraft, on the other hand, was the 
Finance Minister, who was trying to reduce government expenditures overall, and spending on 
air defence equipment in particular–– with defence spending consuming around 40 percent of the 
federal budget. The Prime Minister and most of the Cabinet sympathized with Fleming on the 
matter of defence spending; however, they were focused on implementing election promises to 
increase program spending in the areas of hospitalization, family allowances, old age pensions, 
unemployment insurance and housing.  
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During the months of delay, various other forces in the domestic arena were waging 
strong efforts to either continue the Arrow program or end it. The former included senior RCAF 
officials, senior executives at A.V. Roe, Members of Parliament with seats around Malton, 
Cabinet Ministers such as the Ministers of Defence Production and Labour whose portfolios and 
budgets were directly affected, retired defence professionals, and passionate enthusiasts of the 
excitingly innovative, Canadian-developed fighter-interceptor in the public and press. The forces 
in the public realm who wanted to end the Arrow program included some defence experts who 
argued that the Arrow did not fit with international strategic realities, and editorial and public 
opinion which viewed the cost of the Arrow, no matter how innovative its technology might be, 
to be unacceptable––again given changes in the international environment. What neoclassical 
realism reveals, looking at the Arrow case, is that international strategic realities are determinant 
in foreign policy-making but nations may be influenced by forces in the domestic policy process.  
According to David McDonough, one of the factors that can influence a state’s 
perception of the international strategic environment is its geopolitical location in relation to 
other important states. He notes that Canada’s “geopolitical-structural” environment––being a 
neighbour to the US–– can be usefully viewed as a contextual or “operational milieu” for 
Canadian decision-makers: it does not necessarily determine Canada’s strategic behaviour, “but 
it can constrain Canada’s policy options and compel Ottawa to make significant decisions and 
choices in its foreign, defence and security policies.”268 While the thesis has not explored the 
importance of this factor in any depth in the case of the Arrow, it is evident that geopolitics did 
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constrain Canada’s policy options. Because the US was the greater power in a North American 
defence system, it determined what form the North American defence strategy would take––a 
strategy with which a highly sophisticated and expensive Canadian-developed fighter-interceptor 
did not really fit. And yet the final decision to cancel the Arrow can also be seen as the product 
of an assessment by Canada’s own defence experts of what changes were actually taking place in 
the international strategic environment. As Andrew Richter has demonstrated, the advice from 
which the Canadian Government took its measure in the mid- to late 1950s was the advice that it 
received from senior Canadian military experts such as the Canadian Army Operational Research 
Establishment’s R.J. Sutherland and the Defence Research Board’s A.H. Zimmerman and J.E. 
Keyston. These officials were predicting that the Soviets would cease producing bombers in 
1960, several years before the date predicted by their US counterparts––thus hastening the 
Diefenbaker government’s decision to end the Arrow program.  
Another part of the “operational milieu” for Canada in regard to the US was the inchoate 
relationship between the US and Canada defence industries. There is little doubt that there were 
constraints on Canada’s options regarding the Arrow because of the strong grip of the US aircraft 
industry on the development of fighter-interceptor aircraft for defending North America. As 
Lawrence Aronsen has shown, there was no post-war case where the US had deployed frontline 
fighters that had been developed by another country.269 And yet there were individuals and 
forces within the US defence system that were working in the opposition direction, giving 
Canadian leaders hope that the Arrow might be developed for North American defence. Story 
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and Isinger,270 and other writers,271 have demonstrated that senior US officials at places such as 
Hughes Aircraft and in the US Defence Department that provided significant research support 
for the development of the Arrow, and that there was an opportunity for Canada, which its 
officials failed to seize, whereby the US would have purchased Arrow aircraft to operate out of 
Canada’s NORAD bases.  
Neoclassical realism is well suited to examine the events and forces surrounding 
important foreign policy decision-making, such as that found in the latter days before the 
cancellation of the Avro CF-105 Arrow, because it allows for a systematic exploration of foreign 
policy decision-making, that covers both domestic and international strategic influences. It takes 
into consideration the fact that domestic factors in foreign policy are not negligible and often 
impact elite decision-making. However, it does not expect such domestic considerations to have 
enough of an impact to determine the direction of grand strategy.272  
Haglund and Onea maintain that the roots of neoclassical realism are found in traditional 
approaches to the study of Canadian foreign policy: “Surprisingly and paradoxically, something 
like neoclassical realism actually has been a staple of Canadian foreign policy for years, both in 
practice and in theory – and this even though few Canadian academics or policy makers would 
conceive of themselves as being neoclassical (or any other kind of realists).”273 The traditional 
approach to analyzing Canadian foreign policy, taken by traditional scholars such as John W. 
Holmes, Denis Stairs and James Eayrs was atheoretical and has existed largely outside of the 
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theoretical debates of international relations.274 The utility and persuasiveness of their writings, 
says Brian Bow:   
does not come from their grounding in a theoretical framework, but rather from the 
analyst’s personal credibility, direct experience, and/or thorough research. It is not 
interested in constructing elaborate theories or accumulating a foundation of knowledge, 
but rather in building a repository of wisdom about Canadian foreign policy that can guide 
policymakers and improve the quality of public debate.275  
 
And yet as Kim Richard Nossal has observed, scholars like Holmes, Eayrs and even 
historians like C.P. Stacey used a modified statist paradigm that viewed the state as constrained 
and at the same time driven by societal preferences.276 Dan Middlemiss and Joel Sokolsky, two 
other traditional writers in the field of Canadian foreign policy, also identify the importance of 
domestic constraints on foreign policy: it is “because the external environment does not 
automatically determine all of Canadian defence policy that the governmental and domestic 
environments are also important in understanding the process and content of defence decision 
making.”277 In short, there are very real and observable domestic constraints that influence the 
decision-making of the government of the day:  
The federal government is the paramount institution with respect to national-security 
issues: it filters the interests, demands, and pressures emanating from Canadian domestic 
society and from the broader reaches of the international system.  Here, competing and 
                                                
274 Brian Bow, “Paradigms and Paradoxes: Canadian foreign policy in theory, research, and 
practice” International Journal 65, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 373. 
275 Ibid., 374. 
276 Kim Richard Nossal, “Analyzing the Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy,” 
International Journal 39 (1983): 18. See also: James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada (5 vols; 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964-83); John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: 
Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957 (2 vols; Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1979, 1982); CP. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External 
Policies. I: 1867-1921 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1977), and II: 1921-1948 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1981).  
277 D.W. Middlemiss, J.J. Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants (Toronto: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada Inc., 1989), 225. 
  85 
often contradictory influences on defence policy are brought together and assessed, and 
authoritative decisions are rendered regarding their relative priority. Here, too, broad 
decisions on policy substance are translated into their budgetary and resource components 
and are then transformed into the particulars of military posture and deployment through 
the process of policy implementation.278 
 
In conclusion, neoclassical realism is useful as an approach to studying foreign policy- 
making in that it allows one to take account, in a more systematic way than older, traditional 
approaches, the influence of political leaders, legislative processes, official advisors, experts 
(past and present), different interests, and the public in decision-making, while still recognizing 
the primacy of the external environment. It effectively and systematically reconciles domestic 
and external elements of foreign policy-making.  
 
Limitations of the Framework 
Today there is both criticism and praise of neoclassical realism. Onea asserts that 
“neoclassical realism’s extended theoretical family is simply too diverse to cohere. Future 
quarrels among the siblings are likely.”279 Neoclassical realism has been criticized for its lack of 
parsimony when compared to other realist schools280––although this weakness, it is argued, is 
“well compensated by explanatory accuracy in accounting for the world as it is, not as it should 
ideally be for the sake of theoretical convenience.”281 The framework certainly has its limitations 
when applied to the case study. That the RCAF’s auxiliary pilots were unable to fly the Arrow 
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279 Tudor Onea, review of Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. 
Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, International Journal 64 (2008-2009): 855. 
Tudor Onea assesses the dominant strands of neoclassical realism in a subsequent 2012 article. 
See Onea, “Putting the ‘Classical’ in Neoclassical Realism,” 139-164. 
280 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, International 
Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 5-55.  
281 Onea, “Putting the ‘Classical’ in Neoclassical Realism,” 156.  
  86 
because of its complex technology was a factor in the cancellation that is not explained by the 
theory. Nor does it explain the role of the aircraft lobbies in the US and UK that prevented 
foreign sales of the Arrow. But it helps provide a corrective to the simplistic treatments of the 
Diefenbaker government’s handling of the complex and extremely difficult challenges posed by 
the Arrow program, which have largely written off its decision to cancel the aircraft as 
“abrupt”282 and a travesty. What the archival record shows, and what neoclassical realism casts 
in sharper relief, is that the Diefenbaker government was influenced by domestic pressures 
pulling it in opposite directions on the Arrow program. These pressures were sustained and 
powerful but their impact did not extend to changing the basic requirement that the government 
fashion defence policy in terms of the imperatives of the international strategic environment.  
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